The Tehran Meeting and the Absence of the Islamic Emirate: An Analytical Overview

By: Center for Strategic & Regional Studies

Note: Click here for the PDF file of this analysis.

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In this issue:

    1. The Tehran Meeting and the Absence of the Islamic Emirate: An Analytical Overview
    2. Motivations Behind the Tehran Meeting
    3. Reasons for the Islamic Emirate’s Non-Participation
    4. Conclusion
    5. Recommendations
    6. References

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Introduction

In recent years, numerous regional and international formats, meetings, and mechanisms have been established under the banner of addressing the Afghan crisis. A wide range of countries and international organizations have taken the initiative to convene conferences and dialogue platforms focused on Afghanistan. While these efforts are often presented as attempts to promote stability and resolution, a key underlying motivation has been the desire of participating actors to enhance their political influence and strategic leverage over developments in Afghanistan. Within this context, Iran has recently launched a new diplomatic initiative by hosting a meeting in Tehran involving representatives of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. Pakistan participated at the level of the Prime Minister’s Special Representative; Russia and Uzbekistan were represented by presidential envoys; while China, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan sent officials at the level of their respective ministries of foreign affairs. [i] The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was formally invited to attend this meeting. However, one day prior to its commencement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate announced its decision not to participate. This decision has drawn attention and prompted debate among observers and policymakers. [ii] Two central questions emerge from this development. First, what were the primary motivations and objectives behind convening the Tehran meeting? Second, what factors contributed to the Islamic Emirate’s decision to abstain from participation? This analysis seeks to explore these questions and examine the broader political and regional implications of the meeting.

Motivations Behind the Tehran Meeting

Iran is one of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries that has developed relatively close interactions with the Islamic Emirate following its return to power. The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Western-backed government created a significant opportunity for Iran to expand its economic presence in the country in the absence of American influence. In addition, Western sanctions on the Islamic Emirate and the emergence of tensions between Kabul and Islamabad have further positioned Iran favorably in Afghanistan’s economic landscape. Against this backdrop, several key motivations behind Tehran’s decision to convene this meeting can be identified. First, despite maintaining extensive engagement with the Islamic Emirate, Iran has largely remained on the margins of major political platforms and diplomatic formats concerning Afghanistan. For example, Russia has been able to secure a central role through the Moscow Format and other initiatives, while China has established its own mechanisms to remain actively involved in Afghan affairs. In contrast, despite Iran’s significant political, economic, and cultural presence in Afghanistan, it has played a limited role in hosting regional meetings or shaping formal regional frameworks focused on Afghanistan. Consequently, one of Tehran’s primary motivations for organizing this meeting appears to have been to enhance its role and visibility in regional Afghanistan-related processes. Iran had previously even expressed readiness to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, indicating its desire for a more active diplomatic role. A second motivation was Iran’s interest in placing issues of particular concern to Tehran on the regional agenda. Iran is the only neighboring country that has hosted millions of Afghan refugees over several decades and, following the return of the Islamic Emirate, experienced another large influx of Afghan migrants. By framing the refugee issue as a collective regional challenge, Iran seeks to leverage its role as a host country to gain political and economic concessions. Although the final statement of the meeting avoided binding commitments, participating countries called on international organizations to facilitate the dignified return of Afghan refugees, reflecting Iran’s efforts to internationalize this issue.       [iii] Another possible objective of the Tehran meeting was to apply indirect political pressure on the Islamic Emirate through a regional mechanism, encouraging greater responsiveness to Iran’s concerns. Rather than raising sensitive issues through direct bilateral channels, Tehran may have viewed this forum as a more effective and less confrontational instrument. From another perspective, Iran may also have intended to signal to the Islamic Emirate that it possesses the capacity, if necessary, to mobilize a degree of regional consensus. That said, the extent to which regional countries align with Iran’s priorities remains uncertain, as each participating state has its own distinct interests in Afghanistan and engages with the Islamic Emirate primarily on the basis of national considerations. Finally, this initiative can be understood as part of Iran’s broader effort to increase its geopolitical weight and consolidate its role as a key factor in shaping regional dynamics. Despite facing Western sanctions, sustained external pressure, and regional tensions—particularly with Israel—which have absorbed and constrained much of its strategic capacity, Iran remains a significant regional player. Given the range of political, economic, and security instruments at its disposal in the Afghan context, Tehran has been concerned about appearing relatively passive compared to other regional competitors. Through convening this meeting, Iran sought to overcome this inertia by establishing an “Iranian channel” on Afghanistan and reasserting a regional role commensurate with its perceived capabilities.

Reasons for the Islamic Emirate’s Non-Participation

As noted in the introduction, Iran formally invited the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to send a representative to the Tehran meeting. However, Ahmad Zia Takal, Head of Information and Public Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced that the Islamic Emirate had decided not to participate. In explaining this decision, he stated that the Islamic Emirate maintains continuous and active engagement with all regional countries through existing regional organizations, established diplomatic formats, and bilateral mechanisms. According to Takal, tangible and practical progress has already been achieved in strengthening regional understanding and expanding cooperation through these channels. He further emphasized that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan believes that reinforcing existing regional formats constitutes a more effective approach to promoting cooperation, convergence, and mutual understanding among regional states. On this basis, the Islamic Emirate reaffirmed its commitment to constructive engagement, reciprocal cooperation, and the development of regional relations within established frameworks, and indicated that it intends to continue pursuing this approach. [iv] Beyond these official and publicly stated reasons, several more fundamental factors appear to have influenced the Islamic Emirate’s decision not to attend the meeting. These can be outlined as follows. Disagreement with the Agenda of the Meeting: The most significant factor appears to have been the Islamic Emirate’s lack of agreement with the agenda and overall framing of the meeting. Statements by Iranian officials and the general tone surrounding the conference suggested that the meeting was intended to address issues portraying Afghanistan as a country facing an ongoing crisis. From Iran’s perspective as the host, Afghanistan was implicitly presented as a continued source of insecurity and a serious threat to the region, with neighboring countries expected to use the forum to propose approaches for mitigating security risks allegedly emanating from Afghan territory. Such a framing stands in contrast to the Islamic Emirate’s consistent emphasis on the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan. From its viewpoint, many of the issues likely to be raised at the meeting fall within Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Addressing these matters in an external forum is therefore perceived as a form of interference in the country’s domestic sovereignty. Accordingly, by declining to participate, the Islamic Emirate sought to convey two key messages. First, it aimed to signal that the prevailing regional characterization of Afghanistan is, in general, unacceptable from its perspective. Second, participation in such a meeting could have been interpreted as an implicit endorsement of external narratives portraying Afghanistan’s situation as fundamentally unstable or problematic. The decision to abstain was thus intended to avoid legitimizing interpretations and policy approaches that the Islamic Emirate does not share. Expression of Dissatisfaction with Iran’s Dual Approach: A second reason for the Islamic Emirate’s non-participation may lie in its growing dissatisfaction with what it perceives as Iran’s dual-track approach toward Afghanistan. On the one hand, Iran has hosted opponents of the Islamic Emirate and has allowed them to engage in political and organizational activities on its territory. This has effectively, albeit indirectly, provided space for anti–Islamic Emirate actors to operate. On the other hand, Tehran continues to claim that it maintains friendly and close relations with the Islamic Emirate. This ambivalent posture—often characterized as simultaneously accommodating opposing positions—appears to have undermined trust between the two sides. As a result, the Islamic Emirate may have chosen to maintain a degree of political distance from Iran. Its decision not to participate in the Tehran meeting can thus be interpreted as an implicit signal of dissatisfaction with what it views as Iran’s contradictory behavior toward Afghanistan. Signaling a Balancing Foreign Policy: Another contributing factor relates to the Islamic Emirate’s broader foreign policy orientation. Regional countries, particularly Iran, frequently emphasize the integration of Afghanistan into the region. While the precise indicators of such “regional integration” remain unclear, statements and policy positions by Iranian officials suggest that Tehran seeks to position Afghanistan within a regional framework defined largely by Iranian strategic preferences, while simultaneously limiting Afghanistan’s engagement with Western countries. In practical terms, this approach implies an expectation that Afghanistan would confine its external relations primarily to the region and adopt a confrontational posture toward the West, consistent with Iran’s own strategic outlook. Although most Western countries, including the United States, have thus far maintained political distance from the Islamic Emirate, this does not necessarily imply that the Islamic Emirate seeks hostility or confrontation with them. Since returning to power, the Islamic Emirate has consistently articulated neutrality and balance as the core principles of its foreign policy and has largely adhered to these principles in practice. Within this framework, it aims to expand regional relations while also signaling to Western countries that, under a balanced foreign policy, they can re-engage with Afghanistan. This includes the possibility of reopening embassies and pursuing legitimate interests through formal and transparent diplomatic channels. Non-participation in the Tehran meeting may therefore be understood as an effort to demonstrate strategic autonomy and reaffirm a policy of balanced engagement rather than alignment with any single regional axis. Managing the Risk of Pakistani Leverage: The Tehran meeting took place at a time when relations between the Islamic Emirate and Pakistan were at one of their lowest points, marked by a fragile and tense atmosphere. Although Iran’s foreign minister stated that Afghanistan–Pakistan relations were not formally included on the meeting’s agenda, this did not rule out the possibility of informal discussions, side meetings, or indirect positioning on this issue. From this perspective, the Islamic Emirate’s absence can be seen as a deliberate choice to avoid forums where Pakistan’s presence could enable it to shape narratives, articulate demands, or mobilize third-party support. By staying away, Kabul sought to prevent Islamabad from using the meeting as an instrumental platform to extract political concessions or impose diplomatic costs in the presence of an Afghan representative. In essence, this approach reflects a risk-management strategy aimed at preventing sensitive bilateral disputes from being transferred into multilateral diplomatic settings, where they could be amplified or leveraged against the Islamic Emirate in a public and coordinated manner.

Conclusion

The Tehran meeting can be assessed as Iran’s attempt to position itself as one of the key diplomatic reference points for addressing Afghanistan-related issues. A country that has long faced severe Western pressure and relative isolation, Iran appears to have used this initiative to demonstrate its continued capacity to break out of diplomatic isolation and exert influence over regional affairs. Contrary to expectations, however, the central stakeholder in such a meeting—the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—did not participate despite being formally invited. The announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate regarding its non-participation significantly affected the meeting’s relevance and effectiveness. The absence of the Islamic Emirate not only called into question the practical utility of the gathering but also revealed the limits of Iran’s initiative in the absence of direct Afghan representation. At the same time, the Islamic Emirate’s decision underscored the principled foundations of its foreign policy, particularly its emphasis on preserving Afghanistan’s dignity and sovereignty as a responsible state, equal to other members of the international community. The decision signaled that Afghanistan no longer accepts externally imposed definitions of its internal situation and will refrain from participating in forums that frame the country primarily as a source of insecurity or regional crisis. Moreover, by declining to attend the Tehran meeting, the Islamic Emirate conveyed its lack of alignment with approaches that seek to confine Afghanistan exclusively within a regional framework or pressure it to shape its relations with the West through the lens of regional actors—particularly those with adversarial relations with Western countries. This reflects Kabul’s continued commitment to a balanced and independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Islamic Emirate’s absence from the meeting also entailed certain costs. First, participation could have provided an opportunity to directly and explicitly present its positions and clarify its policies in response to prevailing regional perceptions. Second, non-participation effectively left the diplomatic space open to rival actors, particularly Pakistan. This was reflected in critical remarks by a former Pakistani representative on Afghan affairs, who characterized the Islamic Emirate’s absence as a sign of “political immaturity.” Third, Iran—currently a major economic partner for Afghanistan and a viable alternative transit route amid strained relations with Pakistan—may reconsider aspects of its approach toward the Islamic Emirate. The decision not to attend the Tehran meeting risks reinforcing negative assumptions and misperceptions within Iranian policymaking circles.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis presented in this article, the following recommendations can be offered:

  1. Reassessment of Regional Perceptions: Regional countries should revisit their assessments of Afghanistan and refrain from viewing the country primarily as a source of insecurity and regional threat.
  2. Shift from Security-Centered Frameworks: Rather than organizing forums focused narrowly on security concerns, regional states should prioritize initiatives that promote economic cooperation and development-oriented engagement with Afghanistan.
  3. Strategic Use of Diplomatic Platforms: Although the Islamic Emirate’s decision not to participate in the Tehran meeting may be regarded as calculated and principled, it would be beneficial for Kabul to avoid missing such opportunities. Participation in similar forums could be strategically leveraged to articulate its narrative, counter negative framing, and advance its diplomatic messaging.
  4. Proactive and Multilateral Diplomacy: Through active and multilateral diplomatic engagement, the Islamic Emirate can work to prevent the convening of regional meetings that portray Afghanistan as a source of instability or crisis, and instead encourage platforms that reflect a more balanced and constructive understanding of the country’s role in the region.

References

  1. Participants of the Tehran meeting called on the Taliban government and Pakistan to return to the negotiating table. BBC Persian, publication date: 15 December 2025, Available at: Link
  2. The Islamic Emirate says it will not participate in the Tehran meeting on Afghanistan. Ariana News, publication date: 22 Qaws 1404, Available at: Link
  3. Details of the agreed items at the meeting of special representatives of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. IRNA News Agency, publication date: 24/9/1404, Available at: Link
  4. The Islamic Emirate will not participate in the meeting of special representatives of the region’s countries in Tehran. Afghan News Agency, publication date: 23/9/1404, Available at: Lin

The Tehran Meeting and the Absence of the Islamic Emirate: An Analytical Overview

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