Trump’s Peace Board: Objectives and Prospects

By: Center for Strategic & Regional Studies

Note: Click here for the PDF file of this analysis.

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In this issue:

1. Trump’s Peace Board: Objectives and Prospects
2. The Content and Institutional Structure of Trump’s Peace Board
3. The Trump-Centric Nature of the Peace Board
4. Trump’s Strategic Objectives in Establishing the Peace Board
5. Was the Peace Board Established for Gaza?
6. The Future of the Peace Board
7. Conclusion
8. References

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Introduction

In late September 2025, the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, announced the establishment of the “Board of Peace.” This initiative constituted part of the second phase of his twenty-point strategic plan, which was publicly framed as an effort to terminate the Gaza conflict between the State of Israel and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Initially, the Peace Board was conceptualized as a mechanism for mediating the conflict between Hamas and Israel and for coordinating post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. Consequently, it was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council under the designation “Gaza Board.” However, when President Trump unveiled the Board’s charter at the World Economic Forum, neither Gaza nor Israel was explicitly referenced. Instead, the Board was presented as a global institution mandated to address international conflicts and to promote peace and stability on a global scale. Trump extended invitations to sixty countries to join the Peace Board, of which only twenty-five accepted. Membership in the Board requires a permanent financial contribution of one billion US dollars per member state. There is growing speculation that the Peace Board is intended to weaken the institutional authority of the United Nations and to position itself as a potential alternative to the UN system. The Trump administration has frozen funding for numerous UN programs designed to protect human lives and has significantly reduced U.S. financial contributions to multilateral institutions. Furthermore, the United States withdrew from the World Health Organization, climate-related institutions, and international climate agreements. The administration also terminated funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which provides critical support for women and girls in humanitarian and conflict settings. Additionally, the United States exited thirty-three UN-affiliated bodies. Collectively, these actions suggest a deliberate strategy to undermine the United Nations while strengthening the legitimacy and influence of the Peace Board. This study aims to examine the nature of the Peace Board, analyze its stated and implicit objectives, and assess its potential future trajectory within the evolving architecture of global governance.

The Content and Institutional Structure of Trump’s Peace Board

The Peace Board established by President Donald J. Trump is governed by a formal charter consisting of a preamble, thirteen chapters, and thirteen articles. The preamble emphasizes the necessity of establishing a global institution dedicated to peace and highlights the importance of international state coalitions in achieving sustainable peace. Article I: Objectives and Mandate Article I defines the objectives and functions of the Peace Board. The Board is constituted as an international organization whose primary purpose is to promote stability, restore legitimate and credible governance, and ensure sustainable peace in regions affected by armed conflict or at risk of conflict. According to the charter, the Peace Board is obligated to carry out its peace-building mandate in accordance with international law and the mechanisms approved within the charter framework. Article II: Membership and State Responsibilities Article II addresses state membership and responsibilities. Membership is restricted to states that are invited by the Chair of the Peace Board and that formally express their consent to accept the provisions of the charter. Article III: Operational Procedures and Decision-Making Mechanisms Article III outlines the operational procedures and institutional functioning of the Peace Board: (a) The Peace Board is composed of member states. (b) The Board votes on all proposals, including the annual budget, the establishment of subsidiary bodies, the appointment of senior executive officials, and major political decisions such as the approval of international agreements and the initiation of new peace initiatives. (c) The Board convenes at least once annually for voting sessions, with additional meetings convened at other times and locations upon the Chair’s proposal. The agenda is finalized by the Executive Board after consultation with member states and approval by the Chair. (d) Each member state holds one vote. (e) Decisions are adopted by a majority of the states present, subject to approval by the Chair. In the event of a tie, the Chair exercises a casting vote. (f) The Peace Board holds regular meetings with the Executive Board, during which member states provide recommendations and directives, and the Executive Board presents performance reports and decisions. These meetings are held at least quarterly, with time and location determined by the Executive Board. (g) Member states may participate in all meetings through a senior representative, subject to the Chair’s approval. (h) The Chair may invite regional economic integration organizations to participate, if deemed appropriate. Article IV: The Executive Board Article IV introduces the Executive Board. The Executive Board is appointed by the Chair and consists of globally recognized leaders. Members serve two-year terms, are removable by the Chair, and may have their terms renewed at the Chair’s discretion. The Executive Board is led by a Chief Executive Officer, nominated by the Chair and confirmed by a majority vote of the Executive Board. According to Article X, paragraph 2 of the charter, the Peace Board may be dissolved whenever the Chair deems it necessary or appropriate, or automatically at the end of each odd-numbered year. However, if the Chair approves an extension of the Board by 21 November of that year, the Board will not be dissolved.

The Trump-Centric Nature of the Peace Board

An examination of the Peace Board’s charter reveals that it does not constitute a genuinely multilateral international organization but rather reflects a highly personalized institutional structure centered on Donald J. Trump. This conclusion is supported by the extensive discretionary powers granted to the Chair and the establishment of a de facto lifelong leadership position. Key provisions of the charter illustrate this personalized governance design. Appointment of the Chair: According to Article III, paragraph 2 of the charter, Trump designates himself as the Chair of the Peace Board. This provision deviates from democratic and multilateral governance principles, under which the leadership of international organizations is typically selected through a voting process among member states. Extraordinary Powers of the Chair: Article III further grants the Chair exceptional authority to establish, modify, or dissolve subsidiary bodies of the Peace Board at his discretion to fulfill the Board’s mandate. This centralized authority contrasts sharply with the institutional checks and balances common in established multilateral organizations. Control over the Executive Board: Article IV, paragraph 1 assigns the Chair the authority to nominate the head of the Executive Board. Moreover, although decisions within the Executive Board are formally adopted by a majority vote of members present, the Chair retains the power to veto these decisions at any time. This provision effectively subordinates the Executive Board to the Chair’s personal authority. Amendment of the Charter: Article VIII addresses charter amendments and stipulates that any modification becomes effective only upon the Chair’s approval. This clause institutionalizes unilateral control over the constitutional framework of the Peace Board. Unilateral Decision-Making Authority: Article IX empowers the Chair, as the representative of the Peace Board, to issue resolutions and directives necessary for implementing the Board’s mandate. This authority allows the Chair to make binding decisions without consultation with member states, thereby significantly limiting collective governance mechanisms. Restricted Membership by Invitation: Article II restricts membership exclusively to states invited by the Chair, preventing any state from joining the Peace Board without his consent. This selective membership structure undermines the principle of sovereign equality among states. Term of Membership: Article II, paragraph 2 stipulates that state membership is valid for three years unless the Chair decides to extend it. This provision further consolidates the Chair’s control over institutional composition and continuity.

Trump’s Strategic Objectives in Establishing the Peace Board

Overall, it can be argued that President Donald J. Trump seeks to achieve multiple strategic objectives through the Peace Board. These objectives can be broadly categorized into economic, security, and personal-political goals.

Economic Objectives: Trump’s approach to politics has frequently been characterized by a transactional and business-oriented worldview rather than normative or value-driven commitments. In this context, the Peace Board appears to function as an instrument for advancing economic interests through several mechanisms.

Control and Mobilization of Financial Resources Each state admitted to membership in the Peace Board is required to contribute one billion US dollars. According to Article II, paragraph 2 of the charter, Trump exercises autonomous decision-making authority within the Board, enabling him to allocate these financial resources at his discretion. Furthermore, the three-year membership limitation does not apply to states that contribute more than one billion dollars in the first year, and the Chair retains the authority to approve membership extensions. This institutional design creates strong financial incentives and reinforces the Chair’s discretionary control over financial flows. Economic Gains from Conflict Resolution Trump appears to intend to use the Peace Board to mediate current and future global conflicts while simultaneously extracting economic benefits from affected states, including access to natural resources and financial contributions. In this model, peace is framed as a public good for conflict-affected states, while material benefits accrue to the Peace Board and its leadership. Control over Gaza Reconstruction Trump has expressed interest in maintaining direct control over financial resources allocated for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. This would allow him to collect funds from Arab states and other international donors and allocate them according to his preferences, thereby consolidating political and economic influence over post-conflict governance and development processes. Allocation of Contracts to U.S. Companies Another economic objective is the preferential allocation of reconstruction contracts to American companies. Such arrangements would channel international reconstruction funds into the U.S. economy, strengthening domestic industries and reinforcing U.S. economic influence in post-conflict settings. Control of Gaza’s Maritime Port Through management of Gaza’s seaport, Trump aims to secure additional economic advantages, including trade-related revenues and strategic leverage over regional commerce and logistics.

Security Objectives

Trump also appears to seek to reshape global and regional security governance through the Peace Board, positioning it as a centralized security mechanism under his leadership. Key security objectives include:

Preventing Hamas activities in Gaza;
Ensuring Israel’s long-term security;
Containing Iran’s influence in the Middle East;
Safeguarding U.S. security interests in major global conflicts and crises.

These objectives indicate an attempt to integrate peace-building mechanisms with broader strategic and geopolitical priorities.

Personal and Political Objectives

Beyond economic and security considerations, the Peace Board also serves Trump’s personal and political ambitions.

Self-presentation as a global leader and peacemaker, enhancing his international political legacy;
Re-nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, reinforcing symbolic and reputational capital;
Continuation of global political influence after leaving the U.S. presidency, as he would retain the position of Chair of the Peace Board and thus maintain a role in international affairs.

Was the Peace Board Established for Gaza?

Initially, the Peace Board was presented as an initiative aimed at achieving a permanent ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, facilitating the reconstruction of Gaza, and establishing an institutional framework for governing the territory. However, following the official announcement of the Peace Board, it became evident that the charter does not refer to Gaza. Instead, the Board is framed as a global organization with a universal mandate. Trump appears to seek the creation of the Peace Board as a global institution, under which a subsidiary body titled the “Gaza Executive Board” would be established. This Executive Board is reportedly composed of prominent political and economic figures, including U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, former presidential adviser Jared Kushner, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, former UN diplomat Nickolay Mladenov, business executive Marc Rowan, World Bank President Ajay Banga, and presidential policy adviser Robert Gabriel. Each member is intended to oversee a specific domain related to Gaza’s long-term stability and development, including governance capacity-building, regional relations, reconstruction, investment mobilization, macro-financing, and resource mobilization. Additional regional and international actors are expected to join the Gaza Executive Board, including Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Qatar’s Minister of State for Strategic Affairs Ali Al-Thawadi, Egypt’s Director of General Intelligence Hassan Rashad, UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem Al-Hashimy, Israeli-Cypriot businessman Yakir Gabay, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Sigrid Kaag. Notably, neither the Peace Board charter nor the Gaza Executive Board includes Palestinian representation. Interviews conducted by Al Jazeera with Palestinian citizens suggest that many view the initiative as disconnected from their lived realities, describing the U.S. plan for Gaza as aspirational and difficult to implement in practice.

The Future of the Peace Board

Three plausible scenarios can be identified regarding the future trajectory of the Peace Board.

Success Scenario

In this scenario, the Peace Board could play a constructive role in resolving international conflicts, particularly in Gaza and Ukraine. However, this scenario appears unlikely for several reasons:

Major global powers such as China, Russia, and the European Union are not members of the Board.
Effective conflict resolution requires the participation of the primary conflict parties for decisions to be binding; without Russian and Ukrainian membership, decisions related to Ukraine would lack enforceability.
In Gaza, the effectiveness of the Board’s decisions depends on the actual weakening of Hamas, Palestinian cooperation, and sustained financial support from Arab states—conditions that currently face significant political and practical obstacles.

Limited Success Scenario

In this scenario, the Peace Board may achieve partial success by resolving selected conflicts to demonstrate its relevance and legitimacy. However, protracted or structurally complex conflicts—such as those between India and Pakistan—are unlikely to be resolved under this framework.

Failure Scenario

The failure scenario appears more probable for several reasons:

The Peace Board functions as a highly personalized institution under Trump’s control rather than as a genuinely multilateral global peace organization.
Major powers such as China, Russia, and the European Union are not members, undermining its global legitimacy.
Most countries worldwide are not members and are therefore not legally or politically bound to implement their decisions.
In Gaza, the likelihood of Hamas’ re-emergence and Palestinian opposition to Trump’s proposed governance framework remains high.
Trump’s personal and economic objectives embedded in the Peace Board’s design may further undermine its capacity to achieve genuine peace outcomes.

Conclusion

The Peace Board established by Donald J. Trump has been publicly presented as an initiative to end the Gaza war and contribute to the resolution of international conflicts. However, an examination of its charter indicates that the Board does not constitute a neutral multilateral international organization, but rather a highly personalized institution under Trump’s direct control. Key authorities—including the invitation of member states, veto power over decisions, amendment of the charter, appointment of the Executive Board, and even dissolution of the institution—are concentrated in the hands of the Chair. This institutional design reflects a centralized governance structure that departs fundamentally from established norms of multilateral international organizations. Through the Peace Board, Trump appears to pursue three categories of objectives. First, economic objectives include collecting a one-billion-dollar membership fee from participating states, deriving financial benefits from conflict resolution processes, controlling reconstruction budgets and contracts in Gaza, and exploiting economic opportunities associated with Gaza’s maritime port. Second, security objectives involve weakening Hamas, ensuring Israel’s long-term security, constraining Iran’s regional influence, and safeguarding U.S. security interests in major global conflicts. Third, personal and political objectives include presenting himself as a global peacemaker and international leader, seeking renewed nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, and maintaining global political influence by retaining leadership of the Peace Board even after leaving the U.S. presidency. Furthermore, analysis of the Peace Board’s operational mechanisms concerning Gaza reveals a significant deficit in legitimate Palestinian representation. Gaza is not explicitly mentioned in the Peace Board’s charter, and the proposed Gaza Executive Board does not include Palestinian representatives. This absence of local representation severely undermines the legitimacy of the initiative and increases the likelihood that Palestinians will perceive the process as externally imposed. Consequently, implementation is likely to encounter resistance, distrust, and potential failure. Given the lack of participation by major powers such as China, Russia, and the European Union, the absence of Palestinian representation, and the potential for domestic resistance within Gaza, the prospects for the Peace Board’s success appear limited. Overall, the initiative faces substantial structural, political, and legitimacy challenges and is therefore unlikely to achieve its stated objectives in its current institutional form.

References

AJC. “5 Things to Know About Trump’s Board of Peace,” January 27, 2026. Access: Link
Jacob Magid. “Full Text: Charter of Trump’s Board of Peace,” The Times of Israel, 18 January 2026. Access: Link
Ibid.
Edward P. Djerejian. “What Comes Next for Gaza and Trump’s Board of Peace,” January 29, 2026. Access: Link
Al Jazeera and News Agencies. “Trump Launches Board of Peace at Signing Ceremony in Davos,” 22 January 2026. Access: Link