Sudan Through History: Political Transitions, Civil War, and Humanitarian Crisis

By: Center for Strategic & Regional Studies

Note: Click here for the PDF file of this analysis.

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In this issue:

1. 1. Sudan Through History: Political Transitions, Civil War, and Humanitarian Crisis
   2. A Historical Overview of Sudan After Independence
   3. The 2018–2019 Revolution and the Fall of Omar al-Bashir
   4. The Transitional Period (2019–2021)
   5. The October 2021 Coup and the Return of Military Rule
   6. How the Internal War Between Sudanese Military Factions Began?
   7. Consequences of the Sudanese Civil War
   8. Future Scenarios for Sudan
   9. Conclusion
   10. References

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Introduction

Introduction The political history of Sudan, from independence to the premiership of Sadiq al-Mahdi, has been marked by persistent turbulence shaped primarily by the military’s continuous role in the country’s power structure. This role has decisively influenced Sudan’s political and economic trajectory for more than half a century. After decades of instability and successive coups beginning in the 1960s, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, an army officer, eventually seized power in 1989 by leading a military coup against the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. He was backed politically by the National Islamic Front (NIF) under Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. [1]  This alliance between the military and the Sudanese Islamic Movement laid the foundations of a military-Islamist system whose stated goal was to restore political stability and reduce foreign influence. In the decades that followed, al-Bashir’s government managed to establish a form of structural and security stability in a country previously characterized by secessionist tendencies, civil wars, and foreign interference. Through a centralized system of governance, it consolidated control over state institutions, the economy, and the security apparatus. At the core of this structure stood the military and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), while the ruling National Congress Party functioned as the political arm that maintained the link between the military establishment and civilian institutions. During this period, Sudan was able to maintain a degree of independence in its decision-making vis-à-vis Western powers and pursued a more balanced foreign policy toward regional actors, particularly the Gulf states and the Arab world. Internally, al-Bashir enjoyed support from segments of the military elite and major tribal leaders in northern and central Sudan, while externally, he received backing from certain Arab governments at various points. However, by late 2018, a severe economic crisis driven by falling oil revenues, rampant inflation, and mounting international pressure triggered widespread public dissatisfaction. What began as socio-economic grievances soon evolved into political demands, ultimately culminating in the downfall of al-Bashir’s government in April 2019. A transitional period followed, marked by a fragile power-sharing arrangement between military and civilian actors. This phase came to an abrupt end with the October 2021 coup, which restored military control and underscored once again the entrenched dominance and institutional coherence of Sudan’s armed and security forces. [2] This article has been prepared in response to requests from readers seeking a clear and objective account of the current situation of Muslims in Sudan. Drawing on available data and analyses, it provides a comprehensive and impartial overview of recent developments. The article examines Sudan’s historical background, the revolution and the fall of al-Bashir, the transitional phase, the October coup, the emergence of the current civil war, as well as its humanitarian consequences and plausible future scenarios.

A Historical Overview of Sudan After Independence

Following Sudan’s independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, the country witnessed the rise and fall of multiple parliamentary and military governments. [3] Nationalist parties and socialist movements alternated in power through elections, political coalitions, and short-lived military coups. However, internal fragmentation, weak state institutions, and recurring civil wars—particularly in the South—continuously undermined political stability. These conditions ultimately paved the way for Jaafar Nimeiri’s coup in 1969. Backed by segments of the military and revolutionary groups, Nimeiri came to power under socialist slogans and promises of radical reform. Initially inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s model in Egypt, he pursued centralized authority, economic modernization, and social restructuring. Yet, as he failed to manage internal crises and became increasingly isolated politically, he gradually distanced himself from leftist forces and, by the 1980s, shifted toward the implementation of Islamic Sharia. This abrupt ideological turn occurred while Sudan was embroiled in a protracted civil war between the Muslim North and the predominantly non-Muslim South. Although the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement temporarily halted the conflict, Nimeiri’s hasty decision to impose Sharia law in 1983 reignited the war. The resulting legitimacy crisis, collapse of political order, and rising public discontent eventually led to his overthrow in 1985. [4] After a short transitional period, Sadiq al-Mahdi—leader of the Umma Party, descendant of the Ansar Sufi order, and grandson of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, the 19th-century anti-colonial leader—won the 1986 elections. His government attempted to reconcile parliamentary democracy with a Sufi-inspired model of religious legitimacy. However, structural weaknesses within the party system, the ongoing civil war in the South, economic deterioration, and deep ethnic and sectarian divisions plunged the government into political deadlock. Although greater civil liberties and a relatively open political atmosphere emerged during al-Mahdi’s tenure, the absence of a strong central authority and persistent fragmentation among political and religious groups pushed Sudan toward structural collapse—ultimately laying the groundwork for yet another military coup. [5] As political, military, and economic crises intensified in the late 1980s, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir seized power on 30 June 1989 through a military coup. With the support of parts of the army and influential Islamic and nationalist factions—including religious scholars and academic elites—he established the foundations of a new political order. Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, a leading intellectual and figurehead of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, played a decisive role in shaping the ideological framework and political architecture of the new regime. Sudan underwent substantial historical and economic transformations during this period. Beginning in the late 1990s, the expansion of the oil industry and the start of oil exports in 1999 created new revenue streams. Foreign investment—particularly from China and Gulf countries—further strengthened the country’s economic and operational capacity. In the same period, the National Congress Party (NCP) was formed, consolidating a centralized political system that enhanced government cohesion and control over state institutions and internal competition. In terms of infrastructure, the construction of the Merowe Dam (2003–2009) significantly increased electricity generation, irrigation capacity, and agricultural and industrial development, playing a key role in improving national infrastructure. Politically, al-Bashir’s government achieved a major milestone with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 after internationally mediated negotiations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), bringing an official end to the decades-long North–South civil war. In foreign policy as well, Sudan pursued an active strategy, strengthening relations with Arab states, deploying troops to Yemen (2013–2015), and cooperating with major Asian powers in an effort to enhance its diplomatic and financial standing. In many respects, the political, economic, and ideological legacy of Omar al-Bashir remains one of the most significant experiments in Islamic governance in modern Arab and African history. [6] However, his rule was also marked by deep structural crises that critics argue set the stage for widespread public discontent and the 2019 revolution. Extreme centralization of power in al-Bashir’s hands and those of a narrow military-political circle, systematic repression of dissent, restrictions on freedoms, international sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations, high inflation, shortages of essential goods, and major humanitarian crises—most notably the Darfur conflict—severely eroded the government’s legitimacy. Al-Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes and genocide in Darfur further intensified domestic and international pressure. [7] Another critical challenge was South Sudan’s secession in 2011, driven by ethnic, religious, and political grievances, as well as longstanding demands for autonomy. The separation deprived Sudan of a large share of its oil resources, exacerbating economic hardship and fueling public dissatisfaction. Ultimately, the regime’s failure to address popular demands and its authoritarian policies enabled both internal political forces and external actors—supported by international media—to mobilize behind the mass protests that culminated in the 2019 revolution. [8]

The 2018–2019 Revolution and the Fall of Omar al-Bashir

As noted earlier, by late 2018, Sudan was facing a severe economic and social crisis that paved the way for widespread public protests. Soaring prices of food and fuel, the rapid devaluation of the national currency, and long queues outside bakeries in the capital placed Omar al-Bashir’s government under unprecedented strain. According to Al Jazeera, bread prices had tripled, and demonstrations that began in December 2018 in the city of Atbara were directly triggered by the worsening economic situation. [9] On 11 April 2019, the Sudanese military announced the removal of Omar al-Bashir and the suspension of his government, marking the end of three decades of rule. This development was not only the result of social pressure but also reflected deep fissures within the security and military establishment, as segments of the armed forces and intelligence services expressed concern that continued repression was damaging both domestic and international legitimacy. Following al-Bashir’s ouster, the constitution, parliament, and cabinet were dissolved, and a temporary Military Council assumed power. A state of emergency was declared, and negotiations between the military and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) began, culminating in a provisional agreement in July 2019. For many observers, however, this transition was driven not solely by internal unrest but also by foreign interference and coordinated media campaigns aimed at undermining the country’s stability and reversing the significant achievements of al-Bashir’s government. [10] Nevertheless, key issues—such as the integration of military forces into the transitional framework and the timetable for elections—remained unresolved, signaling deeper political crises ahead.

The Transitional Period (2019–2021)

In August 2019, after months of negotiations between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces for Freedom and Change, the two sides signed an agreement establishing a joint Sovereignty Council composed of both military and civilian representatives. The council consisted of eleven members: five military, five civilian, and one jointly agreed-upon mediator. Its structure allocated the first 21 months of leadership to the military and the subsequent 18 months to civilians. This arrangement was less a full democratic transformation than an attempt to balance external pressures, street-level demands, and the enduring military power structure in Sudan. Despite its symbolic significance, the implementation of the agreement quickly faced serious challenges. Fundamental questions regarding the formation of the cabinet, the scope of the council’s powers, the electoral timeline, and the role of political parties remained unresolved. During this period, competing interpretations emerged concerning the roots of Sudan’s political and economic crises. Some argued that the transitional government’s failure to address fundamental issues stemmed largely from unrealistic international expectations and external constraints, rather than shortcomings of the previous regime. One of the most pressing challenges of the transitional period was the deepening economic and financial crisis. A May 2020 report by the United States Institute of Peace indicated that Sudan’s economy had further weakened after al-Bashir’s fall, with declining domestic production and increasing reliance on the informal sector and remittances. ^[11]  Other analyses emphasized that the worsening economic situation during the transition was not solely the result of transitional policies but also reflected adverse global conditions and systemic mismanagement of resources. According to these sources, the transitional authorities bore limited responsibility for the continuation or intensification of the crisis. Meanwhile, Omar al-Bashir’s trial began in August 2019, resulting in a two-year prison sentence. Despite his removal, many of the structures established during his rule—particularly those controlling economic assets, security institutions, and the military hierarchy—remained intact and continued to serve as partial pillars of national stability. [12]

The October 2021 Coup and the Return of Military Rule

On 25 October 2021, the Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—one of the key figures in the military establishment during al-Bashir’s era and a central actor in the transitional period—declared a state of emergency, dissolved the government, and disbanded the joint Sovereignty Council. This effectively halted the planned transfer of power to civilian authorities. During the same operation, joint forces from the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemetti, intervened, and the then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, a technocrat, was placed under house arrest. The coup occurred precisely at the time when the leadership of the Sovereignty Council was scheduled to shift to civilian hands. The military justified its actions by invoking the need to prevent “security collapse and internal conflict,” while pledging to hold elections in July 2023 and to form a technocratic government. [13]  Domestic and international reactions were swift. Protesters returned to the streets, demanding the restoration of the civilian-led movement. The United States suspended US$700 million in economic assistance, and Western governments—including the United Kingdom and the European Union—condemned the coup as a betrayal of Sudan’s democratic transition. ^[14] Although Western media and affiliated institutions framed these events as a “return to military authoritarianism,” some analysts argued that the intervention was necessary to restore order, safeguard national sovereignty, and prevent the country from collapsing under what they viewed as the transitional government’s misguided policies. From their perspective, several reforms promoted under the banners of “legal restructuring” and “press freedom” were not aligned with national interests but instead aimed at weakening the military, eroding national identity, and undermining Sudan’s Islamic values. Consequently, halting or delaying these reforms was considered by these analysts a prudent decision to preserve internal cohesion and prevent foreign dominance over Sudanese political decision-making. ^[15]

How the Internal War Between Sudanese Military Factions Began

Following the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, Sudan entered a new phase of political transformation in which a strategic but fragile alliance emerged between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. Although both factions had cooperated in overthrowing al-Bashir, their partnership was rooted in temporary interests. Initially, they divided power to prevent full authority from transitioning to civilians. However, this arrangement soon revealed deep structural and political fractures. The SAF viewed itself as the legitimate national institution responsible for safeguarding Sudan’s territorial integrity, whereas the RSF sought institutional autonomy and a greater share of political and economic influence. These tensions intensified during the transitional government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Both Burhan and Hemedti feared a reduction in their influence, but competition within the military camp simultaneously grew as each side aspired to gain full control of the state apparatus. The coup of 25 October 2021—executed by Burhan with initial support from Hemedti against the civilian government—marked a turning point. What began as a joint effort to reassert military authority soon transformed into a power struggle between the two top commanders, each claiming to be the true guarantor of stability and security in the country. By early 2023, the implementation of the Framework Agreement, which aimed to integrate the RSF into the national army, became the immediate trigger for civil war. General al-Burhan, presenting himself as the defender of the army’s institutional integrity, insisted on completing RSF integration within two years to re-establish a unified command structure and prevent the rise of parallel armed forces. Hemedti, however, demanded a ten-year transition period—effectively seeking to preserve his independent power base. On 15 April 2023, open conflict erupted in Khartoum and quickly spread to other major cities, including Omdurman, El-Fasher, Nyala, and Geneina. The war soon evolved into a full-scale, urban conflict: the SAF relied on artillery and air power, while the RSF entrenched itself in residential neighborhoods and government buildings, intensifying street-to-street fighting. The conflict has unfolded in several key phases:

1. Phase One (15–17 April 2023): Initial RSF attacks on Khartoum and temporary seizure of the airport and presidential palace.
2. Phase Two (April–October 2023): Expansion of the conflict into Darfur and the consolidation of RSF control over Wad Madani and the surrounding areas in Jazira State.
3. Phase Three (late 2023–2024): Emergence of stable territorial divisions—SAF dominance in the north and east, and RSF dominance in the west and significant parts of the capital.
4. Phase Four (2025): SAF recaptured strategic sites in the capital, including Khartoum International Airport, the presidential palace, and several government facilities. However, the RSF under Hemedti continues to hold much of Darfur and parts of Kordofan.

Foreign support has further entrenched the conflict. The SAF is backed by Egypt and some Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the RSF benefits from unofficial support from the United Arab Emirates, transnational commercial networks across Darfur and Chad, and revenue from gold exports. As the war endures, Sudan has effectively been divided into two zones of influence: the SAF controls the north and east, parts of South Kordofan, and segments of central Khartoum; the RSF maintains strongholds in the west (particularly Darfur), in parts of central and southern Khartoum, and in states such as Jazira. The consequences have been catastrophic. State institutions and public services have collapsed, banks and schools have shut down, hospitals are nonfunctional, and widespread human rights violations—including ethnic killings and mass atrocities—continue. The fragmented territorial control reflects intense and shifting urban warfare, with neither side capable of fully overpowering the other. The crisis has pushed Sudan into a prolonged humanitarian, political, and security disaster. [16] Despite severe human rights abuses, diplomatic efforts—most notably the Jeddah peace talks mediated by Saudi Arabia and the United States—have failed to produce lasting results. As of late 2025, neither side has secured a decisive victory. The SAF is attempting to reorganize and recruit new forces, while Hemedti seeks to portray himself as a champion of the revolution and the people, despite significant reputational damage caused by RSF actions in Darfur, Khartoum, and El-Fasher. Overall, Sudan’s civil war is not primarily rooted in ideological conflict but rather in a struggle between two military leaders competing for control over the country’s political authority, economic resources, and external alliances. This rivalry has plunged Sudan into one of the most complex, protracted, and uncertain crises in its modern history, leaving the future of national unity and stability deeply unclear. [17]

Consequences of the Sudanese Civil War

Humanitarian and Social Consequences According to consolidated reports by international organizations, the humanitarian crisis triggered by the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has escalated into what is described as the “world’s largest humanitarian crisis.” By March 2025, more than 11.4 million people had been internally displaced, while approximately 3 million others had fled across Sudan’s borders. Additionally, over 30.4 million people—more than half of the country’s population—require humanitarian assistance, including 15 million children in urgent need of support. [18] Public services, particularly in conflict-affected areas, have nearly collapsed. The healthcare system is on the verge of total failure, schools have either shut down or been converted into military shelters, and women and children remain the most vulnerable groups. These conditions reflect not only the impact of war but also the profound failure of civilian and governmental structures to protect the population. [19] Political and Institutional Consequences The civil war has led to the disintegration of state institutions and created significant governance vacuums. International assessments indicate that the central government has lost effective control over many parts of the country. The already fragile transition toward a national consensus government, constitutional drafting, and preparations for free elections have come to a standstill. As a result, political legitimacy has eroded, public trust in formal state structures has diminished, and the environment has become conducive to the proliferation of local militias and decentralized power centers. These developments demonstrate that the political ramifications of the war extend far beyond the battlefield, deeply shaping the reconstruction of state power and the redistribution of influence. Economic Consequences Economically, the civil war has severely undermined production, exports, and trade. Prolonged conflict has disrupted transportation routes, damaged critical infrastructure, and caused sharp increases in inflation and the prices of essential goods. Reports indicate that more than 30 million people are facing acute economic and food insecurity. Although precise data on the decline in gold production, oil output, or formal trade remain limited, analysts agree that public revenues, tax income, and foreign exchange reserves have dramatically decreased. The formal economy is effectively sliding into a deep recession or near paralysis. Beyond placing immense pressure on households, these conditions have accelerated capital flight and labor migration, creating long-term challenges for Sudan’s economic recovery. Security and Military Consequences The war has not only involved direct confrontation between two major military factions but has also intensified ethnic violence, empowered local militias, and posed a severe threat to national unity. In regions such as Darfur, El-Fasher, and Kordofan, mass killings, attacks on civilians, and large-scale displacement have been reported. These violations underscore the widening fragmentation of Sudan’s security environment and the increasing militarization of civilian spaces. Regional and International Implications Regionally, the conflict has destabilized the Horn of Africa, generating massive displacement across borders and affecting neighboring states. The involvement or indirect support of external actors for the warring parties has transformed the crisis from a domestic conflict into a broader regional geopolitical confrontation. This dynamic has deepened the complexity of the war and reduced the prospects for a swift resolution.

Future Scenarios for Sudan

1. Prolonged Crisis and Long-Term Civil War

If the SAF under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Hemedti fail to reach a substantive agreement, Sudan may enter a prolonged civil war. Such a scenario would entail continued urban and regional clashes in key cities such as Khartoum, Omdurman, Darfur, and Nyala, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths, millions more displaced, and further destruction of infrastructure. The collapse of public services—schools, hospitals, and the banking sector—would push the country deeper into a humanitarian catastrophe and widespread poverty. A drawn-out conflict would likely strengthen the role of local militias, exacerbate ethnic violence, and transform Sudan into a battleground for regional and proxy actors. Foreign powers, including Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and global stakeholders, would continue shaping the conflict and the territorial divisions it produces. In this scenario, the likelihood of national reunification in the short term is nearly zero.

2. De facto Fragmentation of Sudan

A second plausible scenario is the effective fragmentation of Sudan, in which territories under RSF control operate autonomously while the central government retains influence only in limited areas. This would result in the emergence of parallel political and military structures, increased ethnic and tribal conflict, diminished state capacity to manage natural and economic resources, and heightened dependence on external support. Such fragmentation would also create expanded avenues for foreign influence, keeping Sudan in a semi-stable yet fragile condition, highly vulnerable to recurring security and economic crises.

3. Temporary Consolidation of One Faction With External Support

A third scenario involves the temporary consolidation of power by one faction—most likely the SAF—through enhanced regional backing from countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or other allies. In this case, the SAF would maintain control over northern and eastern Sudan and key parts of Khartoum, while the RSF would remain confined to western regions and border areas. Although this may lead to a short-term reduction in direct hostilities, the humanitarian and economic crises would persist. The RSF would likely retain influence over key economic assets, particularly gold mines, while the SAF’s political legitimacy would remain weak. Democratic transition processes and elections would face further delays, making the situation inherently unstable and vulnerable to renewed conflict. Sudan would remain dependent on foreign support and locked in a fragile equilibrium.

Conclusion

A comprehensive review of Sudan’s political and military trajectory—from independence to the 2019 revolution—demonstrates that the country’s power structure has consistently oscillated among military regimes, partisan elites, and social forces. Moreover, the period between the fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and the outbreak of civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023 reveals that the current crisis is the outcome of intersecting personal interests, military power struggles, institutional fragility, and external interference. The collapse of the central government, the fragmentation of security and political institutions, and the erosion of state legitimacy have not only plunged Sudan into a profound humanitarian and economic crisis but have also heightened its vulnerability to regional and international intervention. The consequences of the war—including thousands of civilian deaths, the displacement of more than 11 million people, the breakdown of public services and the economy, and the escalation of ethnic violence—underscore that the conflict is not merely a military confrontation. Rather, it is a deep political and social crisis that has affected all sectors of Sudanese society and severely obstructed the path toward reconstruction and the establishment of an inclusive central government. An assessment of future scenarios indicates that Sudan is likely to face one of three trajectories: a prolonged civil war, de facto fragmentation of the country, or the temporary consolidation of power by one faction through external support. Each scenario carries significant and far-reaching implications, but all point to a single overarching reality: the country’s fate will be profoundly shaped by these trajectories. Ultimately, Sudan’s future will depend primarily on the willingness and capacity of domestic actors to resolve their differences and rebuild national trust. The role of neutral and constructive external mediators—supported by calibrated regional and international engagement—can help pave the way toward stability.

References:

[1] Al Jazeera Net, “Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir,” Al Jazeera Encyclopedia, 4 December 2014, link: [2] Al Jazeera, “The complete story of al-Bashir’s fall: a real revolution or merely a change of faces?” 5 May 2019, Link: [3] Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, “History of Sudan: The First Military Government (1958–1964),” Link. [4] Taj al-Sir Othman, “A Critical Review of Republican Thought in Sudan,” Akhbar al-Hiwar, October 2025, Link. [5]Al Jazeera Net, “Sadiq al-Mahdi… a turbulent journey between power, prison, and exile,” Al Jazeera Encyclopedia, 10 February 2010, Link. [6]  Al Jazeera Net, “Omar Hassan al-Bashir… the Sudanese officer who came to power through the Salvation Revolution and was overthrown by a popular uprising,” Al Jazeera Encyclopedia, 4 December 2014, Link. [7] Euronews Arabic, “Al-Bashir and the Sudan protests… a struggle for survival,” 27 January 2019, Link. [8] Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: After toppling al-Bashir, dictatorship must end,” 11 April 2019,  Link. [9] Al Jazeera, “Sudanese protesters set fire to the ruling party’s headquarters,” 20 December 2018, Link. [10] IDEA, “Civil Society in Sudan’s Democratic Transition 2019–2021,”  Link. [11]  United States Institute of Peace, “Sudan, One Year After al-Bashir,” May 2020, Link. [12]   Al Jazeera, “Omar al-Bashir of Sudan sentenced to two years in prison for corruption,” 14 December 2019, Link. [13] Al Jazeera, “After the arrest of civilian leaders, al-Burhan declares a state of emergency and dissolves the Sovereign and Ministerial Councils,” 25 October 2021, Link. [14] CNN Arabic, “The United States announces the suspension of 700 million dollars in aid to Sudan,” 26 October 2021, Link. [15] Al Jazeera, “Sudan… ‘a coup everyone knew would happen before it occurred,’” 25 October 2021, accessible.   Link. [16]  Arab Institute for Studies and Research, “Overview of Sudan’s Transitional Period 2019–2021,” Link. [17] Rapid Support Forces and Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), “Hemedti… between wealth and power,” Al Jazeera, 13 April 2025, Link. [18] UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action for Children — Sudan 2025,”   Link. [19] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Sudan Situation,” accessible. Link.