After two decades, the head of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar appeared in a public gathering in Laghman province. Some lawmakers and government officials had also participated in the meeting, and it was the first time Hekmatyar directly and officially met Afghan government officials since 2001.
Hekmatyar give a speech in a gathering of his followers in Laghman, and then went to Nangarhar and delivered his second speech to a relatively large crowd. On the 4th May 2017, Hekmatyar entered Kabul with hundreds of vehicles of his followers, and participated in a welcoming event held in the Presidential Palace by afghan president. In this meeting, the Afghan President, Chief Executive, former Jihadi leaders and other senior government officials were also present, and Hekmatyar delivered a long speech.
However, one can ask why Karzai wasn’t able to sign a peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar)? Through which phases did Hezb-e-Islami’s struggle passes? can the peace with Hezb-e-Islami be a model for peace with the Taliban? And what will be the impacts of Hekmatyar’s coming to Kabul? These are the questions that are analyzed here.
Why did Karzai not make a peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami?
Although the exact date of the beginning of the negotiations with Hezb-e-Islami is not clear, according to official statements, these talks were started in 1389.
During the second term of Hamid Karzai’s presidency, Hezb-e-Islami’s delegation came to Kabul for several times but these dialogues did not have any outcomes, and the Afghan government was not successful to cut a deal with this faction. According to a research, between Hamal 1389 (solar month and year) and Sawr 1392 (solar month and year), Hezb-e-Islami’s 17 delegations visited Kabul for negotiations. Even after this date, Hezb-e-Islami’s other delegations also came to Kabul, but there are some reasons why the peace talks with Hezb-e-Islami failed. Hezb-e-Islami’s harsh stance and conditions in the negotiations, its weak role in the battlefield, presence of some significant figures and fragmented groups of Hezb-e-Islami in Kabul, opposition of some parties and especially some senior officials with Hezb-e-Islami and lack of international and US support were the mean reasons behind the failure of the earlier negotiations with Hezb-e-Islami.
On the other hand, during the two terms of Hamid Karzai’s presidency, tens of thousands of US soldiers were fighting in the Afghan battleground, and they were focused on war rather than peace. There exists speculations that during his two terms of presidency, Hamid Karzai was surrounded by some former oppositions of Hekmatyar and they were creating obstacles on the way of peace talks. However according to the Hamid Karzai’s Chief of Staff Abdul Karim Khuram, during Karzai’s Presidency foreigners especially the US were creating significant obstacles on the way of peace talks with Hezb-e-Islami.
The Transformation of Hezb-e-Islami’s Struggle
If one evaluates the last four decades of Hezb-e-Islami’s struggle, one will find out that after passing through four phases, this party has also largely changed its formal strategy as well:
The first phase; The ‘Dawah’ period: Hezb-e-Isami’s mother group ‘Islamic Movement of Afghanistan’ or the ‘Muslim Youth of Afghanistan’ started its struggle from ‘Dawah’ in the decade of democracy in Afghanistan and faced many challenges from the communist parties, yet in the decade of democracy due to its ‘Dawah’ aspect, it was known as one of the important party among the existing groups in the country. At that time due to internal disputes, the Islamic Movement divided into two parts.
The second phase; from the ‘Dawah’ to armed uprising: At the end of the democratic decade and with the beginning of Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan’s presidency, the form of Hezb-e-Islami’s (or Islamic Movement) struggle changed and this group started an armed uprising against Daoud Khan which 1354 operations. In these operations, the current leader of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had played the most important role of all. This behavior alongside the ‘Dawah’ struggle continued until the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The third phase; the period of Jihad: this phase started with the Soviet invasion. At that time compared to other phases, Hezb-e-Islami was more armed and played a leading role in the Jihad. But besides its armed struggle, Hezb-e-Islami had also continued its ‘Dawah’. This phase of Hezb-e-Islami’s struggle continued until the party cut a peace deal with the Afghan government. However, after the Taliban’s emergence, the military force of the Hezb-e-Islami had faded, and it no longer possessed the armed forces compared to the Jihad era.
Fourth; entering the invitation and political struggle: due to internal disputes, the firm support of some of the countries from other Jihadi groups and the emergence of the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami’s military power weakened. After 2001, although Hezb-e-Islami was present in the war against the US and NATO forces, this presence was limited in comparison with the Taliban. In addition, some circles and members of Hezb-e-Islami joined the government under Hamid Karzai. On the other hand, Hezb-e-Islami was under pressure of the Taliban in the battleground, and international aids with this group were also decreased. These situations and the withdrawal of the most of the foreign troops from the country affected Hezb-e-Islami, and thus this party changed the form of its struggle and instead of armed struggle began invitational and political struggle. That is why, in the Laghman meeting, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar fiercely criticized Taliban’s aggressive tactic and called the current war as “in vain” and “illegitimate”.
The model of peace with Hezb-e-Islami and the Taliban
Some analysts and senior government officials consider the peace deal with Hezb-e-Islami as a model for peace talks with the Taliban in the future, but the question is whether is it possible or not?
A major particularity of the peace talks with the Hezb-e-Islami was that it was conducted through intra-Afghan talks, but if one evaluates the Taliban’s stance, conditions, and their state compared to Hezb-e-Islami, one will find out that peace talks with the Taliban would not be feasible through intra-Afghan consensus and there would be the necessity of the presence of some powerful countries as guarantors of the commitments.
Second, the peace deal between Hezb-e-Islami and the Afghan government was largely a result of Hezb-e-Islami’s initiative. Hezb-e-Islami bypassed its basic condition, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. It did not gain privileges in exchange for the peace deal with the government. But peace with the Taliban with such conditions, to a greater extent, seems impossible, because compared to Hezb-e-Islami, the Afghan Taliban are powerful on the battlefield. According to SIGAR’s report, the Taliban currently hold control of the 40% of the Afghan territory and challenges the national sovereignty of the Afghan government on a daily basis.
The impacts of Hekmatyar’s emergence on national politics
Hekmatyar’s coming to Kabul would affect the country’s national politics, upcoming Parliamentary and Presidential elections and Hezb-e-Islami’s relations with the Taliban.
Before Hekmatyar’s coming to Kabul, there existed many factions of Hezb-e-Islami, but after his coming to Kabul there seem hopes among inner circles of Hezb-e-Islami that Hekmatyar would bring all the fragments of the party together because according to them Hekmatyar is the most charismatic character in the party and have the ability to do so. But this task is not that simple, and it would be a significant challenge for Hekmatyar, and if the party becomes united, it would have the following effects:
- National Politics; although Hekmatyar was warmly welcomed in the Presidential Palace and the speeches of the representatives of the most of the parties in the Palace was promising and positive, there exists the possibility of confrontation between Hezb-e-Islami and Shiite groups and Jamiat party. Hekmatyar’s remarks in Laghman and Nangarhar and Jamiat-e-Islami’s status and increasing concern indicates so. But these issues will be deepened as the time passes.
- Upcoming Parliamentary and Presidential Elections; Hekmatyar’s coming to Kabul will also affect these alignments. Moreover, due to its strong structure, Hezb-e-Islami would also want to participate in the upcoming Parliamentary elections as a party.
- Hezb-e-Islami’s relations with the Taliban; even from the beginning the Afghan Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami have tenuous relations. In his recent remarks in Laghman and Nangarhar, Hekmatyar also addressed the Taliban. In these remarks, Hekmatyar reiterated on peaceful tactics and criticized Taliban’s aggressive tactic. But unlike his two previous speeches, in his comments in the Presidential Palace, Hekmatyar did not fiercely criticize the Taliban.
- Media; something in common in the three consecutive speeches of Hekmatyar was criticizing the media, which according to him have had programs contrary to Afghan and Islamic values. Some media outlets have fiercely reacted against these remarks of him. If these criticisms by Hekmatyar continued, on the one hand, there exists the possibility of a confrontation between Hezb-e-Islami and the media and, on the other hand, some people among political figures and the public would raise their voice in favor of Hekmatyar, as in his limited remarks, Karim Khalili backed Hekmatyar’s comments in this regard.
The end