

The Consequences of Killing Qassem Soleimani for the Region



The most influential commander of the Iranian regime was assassinated early Friday (3 January, 2020). A drone strike ordered by President Donald Trump targeted Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force, an elite division of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Baghdad International Airport.

The US president cited the killing of Qassem Suleimani as a major achievement, and while promising to do so for the protection of Americans and the world, the Iraqi Prime Minister issued a statement condemning the killing of Qassem Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes. It was seen as a violation of Iraqi national sovereignty and contrary to the requirements of US troops in Iraq. Officials from other countries, international organizations, groups and pro-Iranian organizations have called Suleimani's death a major loss for Iran, but other countries have welcomed Suleimani's death in hopes of alleviating tensions.

Who was Qassem Soleimani?

Soleimani joined the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution, which saw the Shah fall and Ayatollah Khomeini take power. Reportedly, his training was minimal, but he advanced rapidly. Early in his career as



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a guardsman, he was stationed in northwestern Iran, and participated in the suppression of a Kurdish separatist uprising in West Azerbaijan Province. On 22 September 1980, when Saddam Hussein launched an invasion of Iran, setting off the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), Soleimani joined the battlefield serving as the leader of a military company, eventually, in the 1990s; he took over the leadership of the Quds Force. But Suleimani was not well known until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; The Iranian general had been praised by the Iranian leadership for overseeing Hezbollah's tactics in the war with Israel in 3006 and was also able to facilitate a ceasefire agreement between the Shiite militia group Mahdi Army and the Iraqi Army in 2008. CIA officials have described him as a key leader of Iran's ambitions in the region. Suleimani had once told him, "You must know that I, Qassim Suleimani, manage Iran's policy toward Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan," according to former CIA chief Gen. David Petraeus. It has made Quds Force Iran's most important player in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian territories, challenging Israel, Yemen and even Bahrain. What is nowadays called Iran's Middle East policy is mainly the product of the activities of the Quds Force and Qassem Soleimani. He transformed the Quds Force into one of two pillars of Iran's military capability along with the IRGC missile capability.

About Quds Force

The Quds Force is part of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, or CFR. Founded after Iran's 1979 revolution, the Guard defends the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Quds Force performs "operations external to Iran to advance the Islamic revolution. This force is specifically (but not exclusively) propagandized for training and organizing Shiite militias in various countries, with the aim of countering Sunni militias active in the region, which the Iranian government maintains support for Saudi Arabia and Western countries. The Quds Corps has been training and organizing in various countries for decades, including in Iraq (Hashid Sha'bi), Yemen (Houthis), Syria (Bashar al-Assad's government), Lebanon (Hezbollah), Gaza and the West Bank (Islamic Jihad Group).), Soleimani played an important role in consolidating Iran's interests in the region. He strengthened Iran's influence in Iraq by providing financial and logistical support to Shiite militias. The Shiite militias eventually united and formed a popular mobilization group. In Syria, Qassem Suleimani's forces have been helping Assad's



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regime resist popular uprisings and recapture Sunni militant groups, including the Islamic State. It is noteworthy that in Syria, Afghan criminals also participated in Quds-based cooperation, according to statistics, killing more than 2,500 Afghans in Syria. Suleimani assassination weakens Iran's position in the region, especially in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq

Why Suleimani Was Killed?

Several people in Trump's close circle like former national security advisors, Michael Flynn and John Bolton, and "unofficial advisors" like Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have all incessantly urged him to act militarily against Iran and push for regime change. But for three years, Trump chose to ignore their advice, insisting that the US does not seek war with the Islamic Republic. Instead, he slapped Tehran with tough sanctions aimed at crippling its economy, containing its regional ambitions and forcing it back to the negotiations table to sign another deal - a "Trump deal". So, what changed? Well, basically, the Trump administration realized its "maximum pressure" policy has failed. It may have hurt Iran but it did not isolate or deter a bellicose Iranian leadership. Iran's proxy attack on the US embassy in Baghdad earlier this week was a rude reminder of the humiliating 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran that demoralised the Carter administration and the 2012 attack on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi that bruised the Obama administration. The Trump administration, which feared a repeat of this scenario in Baghdad, claims its response was meant to safeguard American lives from future attacks, not start war with Iran. Or, according to the sceptics, it was meant to safeguard the Trump presidency by deflecting attention from the impeachment during an election year. Either way, the assassination is a clear departure from the policy of sanctions, showing Trump's readiness to use US military might as much as its economic power. Actions speak louder than words.

Iran after the Death of Soleimani

From the outset, the Islamic Republic rejected Trump's abandonment of the nuclear deal and the imposition of sanctions as unacceptable bullying, and refused to sit by idly while US sanctions blocked the country's vital oil exports, crippled its economy and bankrupted its military. Tehran expanded its proxy attacks on US assets and



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allies in the area, including recent attacks on tankers in the Gulf and Saudi oil installations, leading up to this week's attack on US positions in Iraq. Tehran has also cultivated new strategic alliances with Russia and China, joining the two for war games in the Gulf of Oman in late December. The assassination is not going to change any of these policies; in fact, it will merely accelerate them. If history is any guide, Iran will absorb the attack at first and avoid an all-out war with far superior US military forces. Trump may have challenged Khamenei for a duel, but the supreme leader prefers fighting in the shadows.

So, respond, he will. His options are plentiful and his timetable is open-ended. This includes assassinations, covert operations, low-intensity warfare and oil and maritime disruptions in the Gulf region. In other words, more of the same - much more. This will especially be the case in Iraq, where Iran has long exploited US failure and retrenchment in order to shore up its allies and clients and increase its strategic leverage against the US. And it may well do that again.

Impact of Soleimani's Death on the Afghan Peace Process

The killing of Qaseem Suleimani, Iran's second most powerful man by US forces could have a negative impact on the Afghan government's peace process with the Taliban. Tehran and Washington will confront each other indirectly in Afghanistan that will be harmed by the Afghan people. Iran has already provided military assistance to armed groups in Afghanistan and will increase its aid if tensions between Iran and the United States increase. If the tensions between the United States and Iran continue, Iran will use the Taliban and other groups for its proxy war. "However, a few days ago, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Iran was actively recruiting some militant groups in Afghanistan. Protects. Another issue linked to recent US-Iran tensions is the Taliban's use of the situation as a pyramid of pressure. The United States is trying to get the talks going between the country and the Taliban as soon as possible and with US conditions. But the Taliban are struggling to gain more points in these talks.



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Conclusion

Now that Tehran and Washington have openly exchanged fire, the two countries' conflict will continue in the shadows, where it has been for 40 years, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guards will still seek to avenge Solomon's blood from the United States. However, Iran now knows after the assassination of Qassem Suleimani that any attack by Tehran and even Iran's proxy elements could lead to another attack by the United States. What has struck Iran in the short term is the pressure from the unintentional fall of the Ukrainian airliner, which was attacked by the IRGC missile, killing all the passengers and aircraft. One can see how far Iranian diplomacy has succeeded in different areas of Aqa, mainly Ukrainians, Canadians, Afghans, and others, with at least some exchange and loss. This incident is very different from that of Qassem Soleimani's murder and Iran's response to it. The unintentional crash of the Ukrainian airliner has long-term political, economic and human consequences that, unlike the first one, will pose a great deal against Iran.

The National Budget for the Fiscal Year of 2020 on the Focus



A few days ago, the national budget for the fiscal year of 2020 was presented to the Lower House (Wolasi Jirga) for approval. But by the Lower House rejected the reason of rejected mentioned the national budget of that year and scandal of 91 code It is analyzed here

National Budget Preparing Procedure

In Afghanistan, a national budget is first drafted by the Ministry of Finance and then presented to the cabinet. After the approval of the cabinet, the budget plan goes to the Senate. After the Senate approval, it is presented to the Wolesi Jirga or Parliament for approval. Parliament, consisting of representatives of the nation-wide nation, examines the budget plan in every way. To see if normal and development budgets are correctly estimated in this year's budget? How consistent is the budget across provinces? And a number of other budgetary aspects are thoroughly investigated by the House of Representatives during a series of debates. In the past few years, it has been seen that the budget prepared by the government is passed by the Senate and the Wolesi Jirga after a series of debates and criticisms. And most of

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the criticism that the House of Representatives has on the budget is left only on paper. Budget criticisms and suggestions that the House of Representatives give to the government are obvious reasons for their neglect and lack of implementation. For example, many lawyers do not have sufficient budget information, and cannot effectively address budget issues with the government. Secondly, there are individuals in the Wolesi Jirga who are not elected to the actual vote of the people, but rather reject or pass a budget plan based on their personal and political interests. Until now, it has been seen that representatives of the public who have relevant information on the budget or who want positive change are left to their demands and criticisms. This year's budget numbers show that this time, national revenue has also increased effectively and its contribution to the national budget is increasing. Yet the Wolesi Jirga's budget this year recalls the government's failure to provide details on precautionary codes, especially the money transferred to the code 91, and the government's delay in sending the budget to the House. The approval of the budget has hampered and delayed it

Problem of Code 91

The Wolesi Jirga is alleged to have illegally transferred 15 billion AFS from 91 codes from the Bank of Afghanistan and significantly changed last year's development budget. But Finance Ministry spokesman Shamroz Khan Masjidi reiterated: "The budget-related rules have the power and authority to make such decisions, except for the budgetary committees of the finance ministry, in Article 16, to make changes to the precautionary codes. And make adjustments. Chapter 21 of the Principles on Payroll, the Ministry of Finance cannot transfer money from the payroll section to other codes, but security agencies are exempt from this chapter. That is, the Ministry of Finance can send money to security agencies even when needed. The finance ministry denies the allegations leveled by the representatives of the public on this basis. That is, around 3.1 billion AFS of the 91 code was spent and transferred to the National Security Agency's top code in light of the law. The Wolesi Jirga, on the other hand, claims that the government should share details with them about the amount spent on the code 91. But according to the Finance Ministry spokesman, neither the Wolesi Jirga, the president nor the finance ministry itself can explain the expenditures from the NDS, and the reason for the secrecy of the secret information at the national level. If seen, there really is no credible evidence of the

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money spent with the House of Representatives on the 91 Code that accuses the government of corruption. Because the government then claims that because it transferred money to 91 Code, Ghazni and Kunduz provinces collapsed and Farah province was in danger of falling again so it was necessary to provide timely help to security agencies. If the Ministry of Finance approves the Wolesi Jirga's assistance in assisting security agencies in similar security situations, it will take time and the security risks will outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, if seen by the security agencies themselves, the president and the US ambassador confirmed that there was corruption. Although it would be difficult to predict the security threats and incidents of the country, the 91 code would have to be set up under the law to set up an independent commission, in order not to be overstated by security threats. Make proper assessment of money spent. The commission, which the House of Representatives should represent, can also circumvent its deception, which the Ministry of Finance is commenting on, and states that the NDS cannot post 91 code details on secret and confidential information sharing. Share. With the formation of this commission, the criticism and concerns of representatives of the people who have been accused of exploiting a particular election ticket campaign in the last presidential election from the 91st jump will also be addressed.

The National Budget for the Fiscal Year of 2020

National budget for the fiscal year of 2020 is 428 billion Afghanis, out of which 289 billion are the regular budget and 139 billion are dedicated to developmental projects. According to the Ministry of Finance statistics show an increase of eleven percent over the year 2019. Of this, 208.9 billion AFs, which account for 48 percent of the total budget, were received from national revenue. Depending on the economic situation in Afghanistan, it was necessary that the Wolesi Jirga approve the budget on time. On the one hand, the salaries of government workers were paid on time and on the other hand development projects that the government allocated budget for implementation were started on their own time. But the Speaker of the House Mir Rahman Rahmani again called this year's budget irregular at the provinces, among other problems, and said that the national budget should not be distributed on account of first, second and third tier regions and provinces. Provinces are subject to deprivation based on this distribution, over the past few years, it has been seen that the government has made a number of changes to the development

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budget following the adoption of the budget. Some of the national projects that have been allocated for the budget have not yet started or are not yet completed. This year, the government has also announced 598 projects, while it has 539 transitional projects, namely last year's projects and only 59 new projects which will be looked at in the future as to how things are going.

Conclusion

The government should set the development budget for the development of the national budget based on the demands and advice of the people at all levels. Although there have been meetings with a number of people from around ten provinces, including Kabul, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. In the future, the government should place the advice and demands of the people of all provinces across the country in the development budget. Not to move national projects to specific areas, rather than to political goals and electoral campaigns, in the development budget, the government should make changes based on national interest and leave no room for doubt. In addition to this, to have a scientific and practical national budget in the future, the procedures and standards that are required for budget preparation should be taken into consideration. For example, the government should start working on short-term and long-term plans to produce accurate statistical numbers. Although some work has been done in this regard, donors may not be needed in the most essential areas. If the government has accurate statistical data available, it can balance the budget distribution across provinces. The media, civil society and anti-corruption agencies should launch comprehensive programs for the general public in order to make the public aware of the right to share their views and wishes in the budget, and to make the relevant aspects available. Focus your work on the installation.

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