{"id":6162,"date":"2025-11-10T08:52:57","date_gmt":"2025-11-10T08:52:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/?p=6162"},"modified":"2026-01-17T10:51:05","modified_gmt":"2026-01-17T10:51:05","slug":"the-defense-pact-between-india-and-the-united-states-and-its-implications-for-the-region-and-afghanistan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/?p=6162","title":{"rendered":"The Defense Pact between India and the United States and Its Implications for the Region and Afghanistan"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>By: Assoc. Prof. Abdul Saboor Mubariz<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<p><strong>Note:\u00a0<\/strong>Click\u00a0<strong><a href=\"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/11\/Weekly-Analysis-En-498.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">here<\/a><\/strong> for the PDF file of this analysis.<\/p>\r\n<!-- \/wp:post-content -->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:paragraph \/-->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:paragraph -->\r\n<p><strong>___________________________________________________________________<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<!-- \/wp:paragraph -->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:paragraph -->\r\n<p><strong>In this issue:<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\r\n<ol>\r\n<li>The Defense Pact between India and the United States and Its Implications for the Region and Afghanistan<\/li>\r\n<li>Background of Defense and Security Relations between India and the United States<\/li>\r\n<li>Objectives of the Pact<\/li>\r\n<li>Regional Implications<\/li>\r\n<li>Implications for Afghanistan<\/li>\r\n<li>Conclusion<\/li>\r\n<li>Recommendations<\/li>\r\n<li>References<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p><strong>______________________________________________<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<!-- \/wp:paragraph -->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:heading -->\r\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Introduction<\/h2>\r\n<p>During the Cold War, the foreign policy of the United States toward South Asia was primarily centered on security concerns. The region was viewed mainly as a battleground against the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Since India was considered an ally of the Soviet Union at the time, its relations with the United States remained cold and limited. Following the end of the Cold War, however, U.S. foreign policy toward South Asia underwent a significant transformation. Washington shifted its focus from Pakistan to India, seeking to establish strong economic and strategic relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, in 1998, following India\u2019s nuclear tests, bilateral relations deteriorated once again. Later, the signing of the \u201cStrategic Partnership Agreement\u201d in 2005 marked the beginning of a renewed phase of cooperation between the two nations. However, in 2018 and 2025, the relationship cooled once more due to U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s decision to increase tariffs on Indian goods and India\u2019s reciprocal response. To rebuild these strained ties, on October 31, 2025 (Friday), India and the United States signed a ten-year defense cooperation pact. This analysis explores the significance, objectives, and potential implications of this agreement for the broader South Asian region and Afghanistan.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668656\"><\/a>Background of Defense and Security Relations between India and the United States<\/h2>\r\n<p>During the Cold War, India was a close ally of the Soviet Union and, as a result, maintained no significant defense or security cooperation with the United States. After the Cold War ended, relations between India and the United States gradually improved; however, defense cooperation remained relatively weak. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States expanded its military presence in South Asia. Once the situation became relatively stable, Washington initiated nuclear-related negotiations with New Delhi in 2004. During these negotiations, the two sides agreed to cooperate in three specific areas:<\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>Civilian nuclear activities;<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<li><strong>Civilian space programs;<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li><strong>Trade in advanced technologies.<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p>This new framework of cooperation was termed the \u201cNext Steps to Strategic Partnership (NSSP).\u201d Building upon this strategic partnership, in July 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed two landmark agreements in Washington, D.C.\u2014one concerning U.S. arms sales to India and the other focusing on nuclear cooperation. The U.S.\u2013India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was finalized and approved by the U.S. Congress on October 1, 2008. Under this agreement:<\/p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>India would grant inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations nuclear monitoring body access to its civilian nuclear facilities for evaluation and oversight;<\/li>\r\n<li>India would strengthen and guarantee the security of its nuclear arsenal to prevent it from falling into the hands of adversaries;<\/li>\r\n<li>India would refrain from transferring nuclear-related technologies to other countries and from engaging in any form of nuclear cooperation with them;<\/li>\r\n<li>The agreement also allowed U.S. companies to construct nuclear reactors in India to generate civilian nuclear energy.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p>This nuclear accord was ratified by the Indian Parliament, the U.S. Congress, and the IAEA, marking a major milestone in bilateral relations. In 2016, the United States officially designated India as a \u201cMajor Defense Partner.\u201d Subsequently, in 2018, Washington recognized India as a country with \u201cStrategic Trade Authorization Tier 1\u201d status, enabling it to purchase advanced military equipment and technologies from the United States. Several key defense agreements have also been signed between the two nations, including:<\/p>\r\n<ul>\r\n<li>The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA);<\/li>\r\n<li>The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA);<\/li>\r\n<li>And the Industrial Security Agreement (ISA).<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p>Since 2008, U.S.\u2013India defense trade has grown dramatically\u2014from virtually zero in 2008 to over 20 billion USD by 2020. Furthermore, in August 2024, the two countries signed the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA), aimed at strengthening defense and security cooperation. In September 2025, India and the United States conducted joint military exercises in Alaska, underscoring their growing strategic convergence. The ten-year defense cooperation pact signed later that same year further highlights the deepening defense and security partnership between the two nations.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668657\"><\/a>Objectives of the Pact<\/h2>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>Strengthening Military Relations:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>The ten-year defense pact aims to enhance military cooperation between the United States and India. Under this agreement, the two nations will conduct joint military exercises and facilitate closer collaboration between their armed forces.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"2\">\r\n<li><strong>Technological Cooperation:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>A key aspect of the pact is cooperation in defense technology. According to the agreement, both countries will work together in areas such as advanced defense systems, cyber capabilities, and space security \u2014 all of which are critical to modern military operations.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"3\">\r\n<li><strong>Intelligence and Logistical Cooperation:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Another goal of the pact is to promote intelligence sharing between the two sides, as well as joint planning and coordination of naval and air operations. The agreement also covers logistical support in times of need, further strengthening operational readiness.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"4\">\r\n<li><strong>Facilitating Defense Trade:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>The pact also seeks to simplify defense and arms trade between the two countries. It provides a framework for joint production of military equipment and defense technologies, and allows for the exchange of certain defense products through bilateral trade mechanisms.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668658\"><\/a>Regional Implications<\/h2>\r\n<p>In August 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump increased trade tariffs on Indian goods, citing India\u2019s continued purchase of Russian oil \u2014 revenue from which was helping finance Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine. In response, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India would act based on its national interests and would continue purchasing oil from Russia. Soon after, Modi visited China for the first time in seven years to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit \u2014 a move that cooled U.S.\u2013India relations while strengthening India\u2019s ties with Russia, China, and Iran. Through this ten-year defense pact, the United States seeks to rebuild its relationship with India and prevent New Delhi from aligning too closely with Moscow and Beijing. Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Pakistan have also improved noticeably in recent months. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asim Munir have met with Trump several times, with the U.S. president referring to them as \u201cclose friends.\u201d This renewed U.S.\u2013Pakistan engagement has raised concerns in India, and the new pact appears to be Washington\u2019s attempt to reassure New Delhi. Historically, whenever the United States has moved closer to either India or Pakistan, it has sought to maintain a regional balance by offering concessions to the other side. For example, after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Washington strengthened its ties with Pakistan, providing it with significant financial and military aid. In response to India\u2019s concerns, the United States signed a \u201cStrategic Partnership Agreement\u201d with New Delhi in 2005 to ensure India was not alienated. Similarly, the current defense pact reflects an effort by Washington to maintain a balance between India and Pakistan and to establish a sense of deterrence in their bilateral relations. President Trump has also announced plans to reduce or eliminate tariffs on Indian goods following renewed negotiations \u2014 a move expected to normalize bilateral relations. It is worth noting, however, that India recognizes the importance of maintaining strong ties with a global power like the United States. Should relations deteriorate, Pakistan could exploit the opportunity to its advantage. For this reason, India appears willing to engage in dialogue and reconciliation. From a strategic perspective, the United States is seeking to contain China\u2019s influence in the Indo-Pacific region and disrupt its economic expansion. To achieve this, Washington relies heavily on India\u2019s cooperation and support. The new defense pact is likely to strengthen joint surveillance, military exercises, and logistical coordination in the Indian Ocean \u2014 developments that could, however, heighten tensions between India and China. As China\u2019s main regional rival, India remains a crucial strategic partner for the United States, and Washington is determined not to lose this alliance. The pact may also intensify strategic competition between India and China across South and Southeast Asia. For Pakistan, however, the agreement carries negative implications. It could undermine the traditional deterrence balance in South Asia and shift the regional military equilibrium in India\u2019s favor. Two possibilities arise:<\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li>The U.S. may have already reassured Pakistan that the pact will not threaten its interests; or<\/li>\r\n<li>If such assurances have not been given, Pakistan may respond by strengthening its ties with Russia and further deepening its partnership with China to restore the balance of power.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>At the same time, the deepening of U.S.\u2013India relations will have a positive impact on India\u2019s allies in South and Southeast Asia, as these countries will also gain new opportunities to enhance their economic and security cooperation with Washington. In contrast, the pact will have negative consequences for Iran. Tehran had benefited from past tensions between India and the United States, which allowed it to expand trade with New Delhi, sell oil, and ease the economic pressure of international sanctions. Now, as U.S.\u2013India relations strengthen, India will be compelled to comply with American sanctions on Iran \u2014 a development that could significantly harm Tehran\u2019s economic interests.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668659\"><\/a>Implications for Afghanistan<\/h2>\r\n<p>The strengthening of relations between the United States and India following the signing of the ten-year defense pact carries several positive implications for Afghanistan. After the agreement was concluded, the United States extended the waiver on sanctions for Iran\u2019s Chabahar Port until April 2026. This exemption enables India to expand its trade with Afghanistan through Chabahar, thereby enhancing bilateral economic cooperation between the two countries. As a result, Afghanistan\u2019s imports and exports are expected to increase, contributing to an overall improvement in the country\u2019s economic conditions. Furthermore, recent tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have led to the closure of several border crossings, causing severe losses for Afghan traders and farmers. In this context, Chabahar Port offers a vital alternative trade route, reducing Afghanistan\u2019s dependence on Pakistani transit routes and mitigating the economic damage caused by the border disruptions. India has also formally reopened its embassy in Kabul, signaling the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This step suggests that New Delhi\u2019s earlier \u201cwait-and-watch\u201d policy toward Afghanistan has come to an end and that India has gained a degree of confidence in the governance and policies of the Islamic Emirate. Consequently, a new phase of diplomatic engagement between Kabul and New Delhi has begun. One factor driving this renewed engagement is the deterioration of Afghanistan\u2013Pakistan relations. Given India\u2019s improving ties with both Afghanistan and the United States under the new defense framework, New Delhi could potentially play a bridging role in facilitating closer dialogue between Washington and the Islamic Emirate. Any such rapprochement between the U.S. and Afghanistan would undoubtedly yield positive outcomes for the country\u2019s stability and development. However, it is essential to note that closer India\u2013Afghanistan relations must not come at the expense of Pakistan. As Afghanistan\u2019s immediate neighbor, Pakistan\u2019s security and political dynamics have historically had a profound impact on Afghanistan\u2019s stability. If Pakistan perceives India\u2019s growing influence in Afghanistan as a threat, it may respond through various means to counterbalance it \u2014 a scenario that could undermine stability and security in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is crucial for the Islamic Emirate to maintain a balanced and pragmatic approach in its relations with both India and Pakistan to safeguard national interests and regional stability.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668660\"><\/a>Conclusion<\/h2>\r\n<p>On October 31, 2025, India and the United States signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement (2025\u20132035) aimed at strengthening military ties, enhancing logistical and technical collaboration in the defense sector, and facilitating trade in arms and defense technologies. Through this agreement, U.S.\u2013India relations have returned to a path of normalization, following a period of tension during President Donald Trump\u2019s administration, when increased tariffs had strained bilateral trade. President Trump has since announced his intention to reduce or completely lift those tariffs, a move expected to further reinforce the partnership between the two nations. While the renewed U.S.\u2013India cooperation may carry negative implications for Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran, it presents notable opportunities for Afghanistan. Chief among these is the renewed U.S. waiver for Iran\u2019s Chabahar Port, which enables Afghanistan to expand its trade with India and attract new avenues of economic cooperation.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668661\"><\/a>Recommendations<\/h2>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>Facilitating U.S.\u2013Afghanistan Relations through India:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Given that India and the United States are strategic partners, and that India\u2019s relations with the Islamic Emirate are gradually improving, the Emirate should seek to leverage India\u2019s role as a diplomatic bridge to help restore constructive engagement with Washington.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"2\">\r\n<li><strong>Expanding Trade via Chabahar Port:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>In light of the ongoing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan that have led to border closures and economic losses for Afghan farmers and traders, the Islamic Emirate should make greater use of the Chabahar trade route to strengthen commercial ties with India and diversify Afghanistan\u2019s regional trade options.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"3\">\r\n<li><strong>Maintaining Balance between India and Pakistan:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Although recent tensions with Pakistan have brought Afghanistan and India closer, the Islamic Emirate must ensure that this growing relationship does not heighten Pakistan\u2019s security concerns. Any perception in Islamabad of India\u2019s expanding influence in Afghanistan could prompt destabilizing responses. Therefore, Kabul should pursue a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy that maintains stability and prevents the country from becoming an arena of regional rivalry.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc213668662\"><\/a>References<\/h2>\r\n<p>Muhammad, M., Hanif, E., &amp; Khan, I. (2018). <em>United States foreign policy towards South Asia: A critical analysis.<\/em> <em>Pakistan Social Sciences Review, 2<\/em>(2), 60. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/342411504_United_States_Foreign_Policy_towards_South_Asia_A_Critical_Analysis\">Link<\/a> Bajoria, J., &amp; Pan, E. (2010, November 5). <em>The U.S.-India nuclear deal.<\/em> <em>Council on Foreign Relations.<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/us-india-nuclear-deal\">Link<\/a> Dutta, A. N. (2025). <em>India, US seal 10-year defence partnership framework, signal strategic convergence.<\/em> <em>The Indian Express.<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/india\/india-us-sign-new-10-year-defence-partnership-framework-amid-tariff-tensions-10338454\/\">Link<\/a> Banibrata, C. (2025). <em>India, US to sign 10-year defense deal: What\u2019s in it for India?<\/em> <em>Vygr News.<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vygrnews.com\/international\/india--us-to-sign-10-year-defence-deal--what%E2%80%99s-in-it-for-india-?\">Link<\/a> India Today Business Desk. (2025). <em>India, US in final talks to ease import tariffs and boost trade ties: Report.<\/em> <em>India Today.<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.msn.com\/en-in\/news\/other\/india-us-in-final-talks-to-ease-import-tariffs-and-boost-trade-ties-report\/ar-AA1OWHW8?ocid=BingNewsSerp\">Link<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On October 31, 2025, India and the United States signed a ten-year defense cooperation agreement (2025\u20132035) aimed at strengthening military ties, enhancing logistical and technical collaboration in the defense sector, and facilitating trade in arms and defense technologies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6163,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[774,16],"tags":[30,35,55,82],"class_list":["post-6162","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-recent_analysis","category-weekly-analysis","tag-foreign-policy","tag-region-world","tag-the-united-states","tag-weekly-analysis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6162","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6162"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6162\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6250,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6162\/revisions\/6250"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/6163"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6162"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6162"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6162"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}