{"id":6133,"date":"2025-10-14T12:31:01","date_gmt":"2025-10-14T12:31:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/?p=6133"},"modified":"2025-10-14T12:33:37","modified_gmt":"2025-10-14T12:33:37","slug":"evaluation-of-the-pakistan-saudi-arabia-joint-strategic-agreement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/?p=6133","title":{"rendered":"Evaluation of the Pakistan\u2013Saudi Arabia Joint Strategic Agreement"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>By:\u00a0<\/strong>Center for Strategic &amp; Regional Studies<\/p>\r\n<p><strong>Note:\u00a0<\/strong>Click\u00a0<strong><a href=\"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/10\/Weekly-Analysis-En-494.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">here<\/a><\/strong> for the PDF file of this analysis.<\/p>\r\n<!-- \/wp:post-content -->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:paragraph \/-->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:paragraph -->\r\n<p><strong>___________________________________________________________________<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<!-- \/wp:paragraph -->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:paragraph -->\r\n<p><strong>In this issue:<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\r\n<ol>\r\n<li>Evaluation of the Pakistan\u2013Saudi Arabia Joint Strategic Agreement<\/li>\r\n<li>Overview of Saudi Arabia\u2013Pakistan Relations<\/li>\r\n<li>The Significance of the Agreement for Pakistan<\/li>\r\n<li>The Significance of the Agreement for Saudi Arabia<\/li>\r\n<li>Implications of the Joint Strategic Agreement for India<\/li>\r\n<li>Implications of the Joint Strategic Agreement for Afghanistan<\/li>\r\n<li>Conclusion<\/li>\r\n<li>References<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p><strong>______________________________________________<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<!-- \/wp:paragraph -->\r\n\r\n<!-- wp:heading -->\r\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Introduction<\/h2>\r\n<p>On September 17, 2025, a <em>Joint Strategic Defense Agreement<\/em> was signed between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh. According to the provisions of this agreement, any attack on one of the two countries shall be regarded as an attack on both. The formation of security alliances between states reflects their respective political, military, and economic needs. The signing of this agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia marks a new chapter in their bilateral relations. It is the culmination of decades of cooperation and partnership between the two governments, through which each party seeks to fulfill its mutual needs via the other. The core principle of the agreement rests on <em>collective defense<\/em>, stipulating that any aggression against one party will be considered an aggression against both. This principle closely resembles the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Charter, establishing a new mechanism for collective defense and deterrence. Given the current political climate in the Middle East, dominated by Israeli aggression, regional rivalries, and the influence of global powers, the recent Pakistan\u2013Saudi Arabia agreement may introduce a new dimension of security balance within the region.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349209\"><\/a>Overview of Saudi Arabia\u2013Pakistan Relations<\/h2>\r\n<p>Bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan date back to 1947, the year of Pakistan\u2019s establishment. In the early years, the connection between the two nations was primarily founded on shared religious and cultural ties as well as mutual trade interests. Over time, this relationship evolved into one of the closest and most enduring alliances in the Islamic world. Beyond common Islamic values, it came to rest on mutual trust, strategic cooperation, and a shared response to regional and global developments. In recent decades, the two countries have supported each other not only in diplomacy but also during times of regional crisis, economic hardship, and international negotiations. The key milestones in their diplomatic and defense relations can be outlined chronologically as follows:<\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>1951 \u2013 Treaty of Friendship:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Saudi Arabia and Pakistan formalized their diplomatic relationship by signing a Treaty of Friendship, laying the foundation for long-term political and economic cooperation.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"2\">\r\n<li><strong>1974 \u2013 OIC Summit in Lahore:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Pakistan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, hosted the Second Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Saudi King Faisal bin Abdulaziz and several Muslim leaders attended, strengthening Islamabad\u2013Riyadh ties.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"3\">\r\n<li><strong>1970s\u20131980s \u2013 The Zia-ul-Haq Era:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Under General Zia-ul-Haq, bilateral relations reached their peak. Pakistan deployed troops for Saudi defense, while Saudi Arabia provided extensive financial assistance, oil supplies, and economic support. The Afghan Jihad further deepened their strategic cooperation.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"4\">\r\n<li><strong>1988 \u2013 Inauguration of Faisal Mosque:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>On June 18, 1988, General Zia-ul-Haq inaugurated the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, with Saudi Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz in attendance. The mosque was built in memory of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"5\">\r\n<li><strong>1998 \u2013 Support During Nuclear Sanctions:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>After Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in response to India\u2019s, it faced international sanctions. Saudi Arabia supported Pakistan by supplying oil and financial aid on deferred payment terms, helping the country withstand severe economic pressure.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"6\">\r\n<li><strong>2000s \u2013 Expansion of Economic and Defense Cooperation:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Frequent high-level visits strengthened cooperation in energy, investment, and military training. Pakistani military personnel were stationed in Saudi Arabia for defense missions.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"7\">\r\n<li><strong>2014 and 2018 \u2013 Financial Aid Packages:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>In 2014, under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Saudi Arabia granted Pakistan $1.5 billion to boost foreign reserves. In 2018, during Prime Minister Imran Khan\u2019s tenure, Riyadh pledged $4.2 billion in financial assistance, including $3 billion for Pakistan\u2019s central bank and $1.2 billion in deferred oil payments.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"8\">\r\n<li><strong>2019 \u2013 Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman\u2019s Visit:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>During his visit to Islamabad, the Crown Prince announced planned investments of $20 billion, including a major oil refinery project in Gwadar\u2014signaling a new phase in bilateral economic relations.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"9\">\r\n<li><strong>2023 \u2013 Support During Economic Crisis:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in Pakistan\u2019s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by depositing $2 billion into the State Bank of Pakistan, helping secure financial stability. <strong>April 7\u20139, 2024 \u2013 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif\u2019s First Foreign Visit:<\/strong> During his first overseas visit in his second term, Shehbaz Sharif traveled to Saudi Arabia. In discussions with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, both sides agreed to accelerate $5 billion in Saudi investments and finalized 34 agreements worth $2.8 billion, of which $560 million was allocated to operational projects. Beyond diplomacy, the two nations maintain deep security and defense cooperation, which includes troop deployment, joint exercises, and military training under various defense pacts. Major milestones in their defense collaboration include:<\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>1967 \u2013 Defense Cooperation Agreement:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>The first formal defense agreement was signed, paving the way for Pakistani military deployment in Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"2\">\r\n<li><strong>1970s \u2013 Troop Deployment:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>At Riyadh\u2019s request, thousands of Pakistani soldiers were stationed in Saudi Arabia to strengthen its defense structure. Pakistani pilots also trained and flew missions with the Royal Saudi Air Force.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"3\">\r\n<li><strong>1982 \u2013 Defense Protocol:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>A formal defense cooperation protocol was signed, institutionalizing Pakistan\u2019s role in training Saudi military personnel.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"4\">\r\n<li><strong>1990\u20131991 \u2013 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm):<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Pakistan deployed more than 11,000 troops\u2014including air and ground forces\u2014to Saudi Arabia for the defense of its territory during the Gulf crisis.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"5\">\r\n<li><strong>Post-2004 \u2013 \u201cAl-Samsaam\u201d Joint Exercises:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Since 2004, both countries have conducted biannual military exercises, reflecting their joint focus on contemporary security threats.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"6\">\r\n<li><strong>2016 \u2013 \u201cNorth Thunder\u201d Military Exercise:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Held in Hafr al-Batin, this was one of the largest regional exercises, with Pakistan playing a leading role alongside Saudi forces.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"7\">\r\n<li><strong>2025 \u2013 Joint Strategic Defense Agreement:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>Signed on September 17, 2025, by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, this landmark agreement stipulates that an attack on one country will be considered an attack on both. The principle closely mirrors Article 5 of the NATO Charter. This latest defense pact represents the culmination of a long-standing partnership and serves as the focal point of this analysis.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349210\"><\/a>The Significance of the Agreement for Pakistan<\/h2>\r\n<p>The <em>Joint Strategic Defense Agreement<\/em> between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia marks a new phase in their bilateral relations and represents a decisive strategic step for Pakistan. Under this agreement, Pakistan\u2019s role in ensuring the security and stability of Saudi Arabia is strengthened. This development comes at a time when Pakistan faces multiple internal challenges, economic, security-related, and political, while externally, it continues to confront a serious threat from India. Consequently, the agreement serves as a political and economic shield for Pakistan, granting it greater access to energy resources and financial assistance, both essential for managing its ongoing economic crisis and ensuring long-term national stability. Furthermore, the agreement enhances recognition of Pakistan\u2019s nuclear capabilities and military expertise at the regional level, while globally, particularly within the Muslim world, it amplifies Pakistan\u2019s diplomatic influence. Another dimension of this development lies in Pakistan\u2019s growing partnership with China. Following recent tensions between India and Pakistan, Beijing has intensified its support for Islamabad. The signing of this agreement further elevates Pakistan\u2019s international standing, potentially attracting greater economic, trade, and investment interest from other countries. Equally significant is the impact of this mutual defense agreement on the regional balance of power. With Saudi backing, Pakistan is positioned as a key deterrent actor in South Asia. In the event of potential military aggression from India, this agreement introduces a powerful deterrent factor for New Delhi, compelling greater caution in its strategic and military calculations.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349211\"><\/a>The Significance of the Agreement for Saudi Arabia<\/h2>\r\n<p>The defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan plays a critical role in strengthening the Kingdom\u2019s security architecture and defense mechanisms. It provides Saudi Arabia with assurance that it will not stand alone in the face of external threats\u2014an especially significant guarantee amid the ongoing instability in the Middle East, particularly the escalation of Israeli aggression and emerging efforts toward establishing a \u201cGreater Israel.\u201d Such regional developments could have adverse implications for Saudi security; this agreement, therefore, offers tools to mitigate these risks and ensure long-term national stability. In terms of military capacity-building, Saudi Arabia stands to benefit from Pakistan\u2019s extensive experience, expertise, and defense technologies. This cooperation reduces Riyadh\u2019s dependence on Western military support, allowing the Kingdom to lay the groundwork for a more autonomous regional security framework. In doing so, Saudi Arabia takes meaningful steps toward achieving greater self-reliance in its defense and security policies.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349212\"><\/a>Implications of the Joint Strategic Agreement for India<\/h2>\r\n<p>The signing of the <em>Joint Strategic Defense Agreement<\/em> between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia raises an important question: what are its potential implications for India? Given the extensive economic and technological relations between Saudi Arabia and India, could this agreement negatively affect their bilateral ties? The key contextual factors are as follows: Saudi Arabia and India maintain robust cooperation in the fields of energy and technology. Approximately 2.7 million Indian workers are employed in Saudi Arabia, contributing significantly to the Kingdom\u2019s modern economy and development sectors. From a trade perspective, India is among Saudi Arabia\u2019s principal partners\u2014the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries reached $42.98 billion in the 2023\u20132024 period\u2014illustrating the depth and maturity of their relationship. Nonetheless, the new defense agreement is largely shaped by Pakistan\u2019s financial needs and strategic limitations, while for Saudi Arabia, it represents a cautious effort to leverage Pakistan\u2019s military capacity. The Saudi leadership seeks to strengthen the country\u2019s governance and defense structures without creating an overly autonomous or powerful domestic military that could pose internal challenges to the regime\u2019s continuity. Thus, rather than establishing a fully independent and expansive military force, Riyadh has shown a greater inclination to rely on external partners\u2014especially Pakistan\u2014for security support. On the other hand, India rarely enters into formal defense commitments with other states and does not typically deploy troops to safeguard foreign governments. New Delhi\u2019s foreign policy remains primarily focused on economic cooperation, including technology transfer and trade relations. Consequently, Saudi Arabia can utilize Pakistani military expertise to fill its security gaps while continuing to sustain its broad-based economic and technological engagement with India.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349213\"><\/a>Implications of the Joint Strategic Agreement for Afghanistan<\/h2>\r\n<p>The Saudi\u2013Pakistan strategic defense agreement presents both opportunities and challenges for Afghanistan. If the pact is genuinely intended to enhance cooperation among Muslim countries and promote economic resilience, the growing alignment between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan\u2014combined with China\u2019s long-standing partnership with Islamabad\u2014could open new avenues for Afghanistan\u2019s regional integration and economic reconstruction. Moreover, the religious and political influence of these states could serve as a positive factor in the <em>de facto<\/em> government\u2019s pursuit of international legitimacy. However, if the agreement becomes an instrument of regional rivalry\u2014such as Pakistan positioning itself against India or Saudi Arabia against Iran or Qatar\u2014it could undermine Afghanistan\u2019s delicate foreign policy balance and have adverse consequences for Kabul\u2019s diplomatic relations. A noteworthy element in this context is the statement by one of the Pakistani Prime Minister\u2019s advisers in an interview with <em>Geo News<\/em>, who remarked: \u201cIf any attack against Pakistan originates from Afghan territory, it will be considered an attack against Saudi Arabia as well.\u201d A closer reading of this statement suggests two overlapping intentions on Pakistan\u2019s part:<\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>Domestic signaling<\/strong>\u2014to project an image of strength while deflecting internal criticism by externalizing blame for insecurity; and<\/li>\r\n<li><strong>Political leverage<\/strong>\u2014to exert pressure on the Afghan authorities through diplomatic and political means.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>For its part, the <em>Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan<\/em> has repeatedly asserted that Afghan soil will not be used against any other state. Moreover, according to the terms of the Saudi\u2013Pakistan defense pact, Saudi Arabia bears no responsibility for Pakistan\u2019s internal security challenges, many of which stem from domestic militant groups or non-state actors. Consistent with this, Riyadh has refrained from making any direct statements implying involvement in such incidents. Tensions between the two neighbors resurfaced on <strong>October 8, 2025 (17 Mizan 1404 Solar Hijri)<\/strong>, when Pakistan violated Afghan airspace. In retaliation, the Afghan authorities launched a limited cross-border operation along the disputed Durand Line, leading to several hours of armed clashes. Following these events, Saudi Arabia\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement expressing concern over the escalation, urging both sides to exercise restraint, avoid violence, and resolve their differences through dialogue in order to preserve regional peace and stability. The statement further emphasized Riyadh\u2019s support for any regional or international efforts that promote peace and development, underscoring that lasting security is a prerequisite for the prosperity of both the Afghan and Pakistani peoples. Analyzed through the framework of the <em>Joint Strategic Defense Agreement<\/em>\u2014which stipulates that an attack on one party constitutes an attack on the other\u2014two plausible interpretations of Saudi Arabia\u2019s stance emerge:<\/p>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li><strong>The Azerbaijan\u2013Armenia Precedent:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>A parallel can be drawn to the 2020\u20132022 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, where Russia, despite Armenia\u2019s membership in a collective defense organization committed to mutual protection, refrained from direct intervention because the fighting occurred outside Armenia\u2019s officially recognized territory. Similarly, Saudi Arabia may choose not to intervene directly in disputes along <em>de facto<\/em> or contested borders such as the Durand Line, opting instead for diplomacy and calls for peaceful resolution. Riyadh\u2019s cautious reaction to the Afghanistan\u2013Pakistan border clashes demonstrates a preference for restraint over costly involvement.<\/p>\r\n<ol start=\"2\">\r\n<li><strong>Saudi Arabia\u2019s Mediatory Role and Strategic Objectives:<\/strong><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p>The Kingdom views itself as a leader in the Islamic world and therefore seeks to prevent escalations among Muslim-majority states. The core purpose of the pact, from the Saudi perspective, is to harness Pakistan\u2019s security capabilities, not to commit Riyadh to direct regional conflict. If these two guiding principles, Saudi mediation and avoidance of entanglement, remain in place, the <em>practical effectiveness<\/em> of the agreement may prove limited over time. As a result, other regional actors might not view the pact as a strong deterrent, and Pakistan may find it difficult to leverage it as a credible strategic shield against India. In conclusion, the Saudi\u2013Pakistan Strategic Defense Agreement presents a mixed set of outcomes for Afghanistan. On the one hand, it could create opportunities for economic cooperation, regional connectivity, and greater political inclusion. On the other hand, if it evolves into a tool of regional competition, it risks disrupting Afghanistan\u2019s foreign policy equilibrium and endangering broader regional stability.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349214\"><\/a>Conclusion<\/h2>\r\n<p>In summary, the <em>Joint Strategic Defense Agreement<\/em> between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has largely emerged from Pakistan\u2019s economic vulnerabilities. The primary objective of the pact is to secure Saudi financial assistance, which Islamabad can utilize to address its internal challenges\u2014whether related to domestic security, external defense, or economic instability. Conversely, Saudi Arabia seeks to benefit from Pakistan\u2019s military and security expertise, thereby meeting its own defense requirements at a lower cost and with reduced dependence on Western powers. At the regional level, Pakistan currently faces tense relations not only with India but also with Afghanistan, where bilateral ties have steadily deteriorated. The Saudi\u2013Pakistani agreement is unlikely to play a constructive role in resolving these disputes. Saudi Arabia maintains strong economic, technological, and trade relations with India and is reluctant to jeopardize those ties due to its partnership with Pakistan. Similarly, Riyadh shares areas of cooperation and mutual interest with the <em>Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan<\/em>; therefore, this agreement is unlikely to undermine or damage Saudi\u2013Afghan relations. Overall, the agreement represents a pragmatic alignment rather than a transformative alliance\u2014driven by Pakistan\u2019s search for financial stability and Saudi Arabia\u2019s pursuit of affordable security partnerships within the broader Islamic world.<\/p>\r\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc211349215\"><\/a>References<\/h2>\r\n<ol>\r\n<li>Mohammed Shoaib Raza, <em>Beyond the Islamic NATO Mirage: The Logic of the Saudi Arabia\u2013Pakistan Defence Agreement<\/em>, published September 19, 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/theweek.in\/beyondtheIslamicNATOmirage_ThelogicofSaudiArabia-Pakistandefenceagreement\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<li>Dr. Muhammad Khan, <em>Chronology of Pak\u2013Saudi Relationship<\/em>, <em>Pakistan Observer<\/em>, published September 25, 2023. <a href=\"https:\/\/pakobserver.net\/chronology-of-pak-saudi-relationship-pakistan-observer\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<li><em>A New Chapter in Regional Security: An Analysis of the Pakistan\u2013Saudi Arabia Strategic Defense Agreement<\/em>, <em>Policy Advisory Board, Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce &amp; Industry (FPCCI)<\/em>, p. 7, PDF. <a href=\"https:\/\/fpcci.org.pk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/A-New-Chapter-in-Regional-Security-An-Analysis-of-the-Pakistan-Saudi-Arabia-Strategic-Defense-Agreement.pdf\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<li><em>The Pakistan\u2013Saudi Defence Pact Does Not Threaten India<\/em>, <em>European Times<\/em>, published September 25, 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/europeantimes.org\/the-pakistan-saudi-defence-pact-does-not-threaten-india\/\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<li><em>Saudi Arabia\u2013Pakistan Defence Pact: What It Means for the Two Countries<\/em>, <em>The Indian Express<\/em>, published September 19, 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/explained\/pakistan-saudi-arabia-defence-pact-explained-what-it-means-for-the-2-countries\/\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<li><em>Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan: An Attack from Afghanistan on Pakistan Is an Attack on Saudi Arabia<\/em>, <em>Did Press News Agency<\/em>, published September 19, 2025 (29 Sunbula 1404). <a href=\"https:\/\/didpress.com\/173733\/\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<li><em>Saudi Arabia\u2019s Reaction to the Military Clashes Between Afghanistan and Pakistan<\/em>, <em>Mashregh News<\/em>, published October 11, 2025 (20 Mizan 1404). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mashreghnews.ir\/news\/Reaction-to-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Military-Clashes\"><strong>Link<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By:\u00a0Center for Strategic &amp; Regional Studies Note:\u00a0Click\u00a0here for the PDF file of this analysis. ___________________________________________________________________ In this issue: Evaluation of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6134,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[774,16],"tags":[30,35,82],"class_list":["post-6133","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-recent_analysis","category-weekly-analysis","tag-foreign-policy","tag-region-world","tag-weekly-analysis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6133","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6133"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6133\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6137,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6133\/revisions\/6137"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/6134"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6133"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6133"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/csrsaf.org\/en\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6133"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}